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NOTE 
Narrowing the Scope of Civil Drug Forfeiture: Section 881, 
Substantial Connection and the Eighth Amendment 
Let this be recorded as the time when America rose up and said "no" 
to drugs. The scourge of drugs must be stopped, and I am asking tonight 
for an increase of almost a billion dollars ... to escalate the war against 
drugs. The war must be waged on all fronts. 
- President George Bush 1 
The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, 
equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection 
all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances. 
- Ex parte Milligan 2 
To note that this country is engaged in a "war on drugs" borders 
on the cliche. In recent years, leading politicians have escalated the 
rhetoric and action against users and suppliers of illegal drugs. 3 The 
public has demanded increasingly tough enforcement, even demon-
strating a willingness to infringe on civil liberties.4 Since 1986, law 
enforcement agencies have stepped up seizures of cars, boats, and 
planes, 5 sometimes for possession of extremely small amounts of 
drugs. 6 As the country continues to fight the drug war, the battle 
1. Text of President Bush's Speech to Congress, Wash. Post, Feb. 10, 1989, at A20, col. 1. 
2. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120-21 (1866). 
3. See, e.g., Text of the Address by President Bush, Wash. Post, Sept. 6,' 1989, at A18, col. 1 
(announcing his drug policy and programs); War Footing Urged far Drug Fight, Wash. Post, May 
25, 1988, at Al7, col. 1. 
4. See, e.g., Morin & Allen, Are We Shooting Ourselves In the Foot In the War on Drugs?, 
Wash. Post, June 26, 1988, at Cl, col. 3 ("[A] new Washington Post survey shows that the public 
is ready to take harsh new measures to combat drug trafficking and use -. including ones that 
would needlessly erode civil liberties."). 
5. See Drug Case Booty En.riches Agencies, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1990, at Al3, col. 1 ("In 1989 
the Department of Justice seized cash and items valued at $580 million, as against $207 million 
in 1988 and $94 million in 1986."). 
6. The height of this activity occurred in May 1988. See, e.g., Tighter Federal Drug Dragnet 
Yields Cars, Boats and Protests, N.Y. Times, May 22, 1988, § l, at l, col. 2; Research Ship Seized 
in 'Zero Tolerance' Drug Raid, Wash. Post, May 20, 1988, at Al2, col. 1; 2nd Boat Seized; Coast 
Guard Says Small Amount of Narcotics Found, L.A. Times, May 13, 1988, § l, at 3, col. 1; 
Smidgen of Marijuana Brings Boat Seizure, Coast Guard Says, L.A. Times, May 12, 1988, § 1, at 
3, col. S; Vehicle Seizures Stepped Up in Drug War; Truck, Several Mercedes Confiscated Under 
'Zero Tolerance' Policy, Wash. Post, May 10, 1988, at A9, col. 1 ("The $2.5 million yacht seized 
by the Coast Guard Saturday after one-tenth of an ounce of marijuana was found on board is not 
the only casualty of the •.• escalating war on drugs."). Similar seizures continue today. See, 
e.g., A House Could be the Price of a Joint Under Federal Asset-Seizure Law, L.A. Times, May 6, 
1990, at A2, col. l; Chi. Trib., Mar. 7, 1990, § 2 (DuPage), at 7, col. 4 (DuPage sports final ed.) 
("[P]olice said they seized a car when officers found 2.5 grams of mar[i}juana on the front seat of 
the vehicle they had stopped for a minor traffic violation. The seizure was made under terms of 
the federal government's zero tolerance law •..• "). 
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should be waged with care to assure the campaign is fought within the 
bounds set by the Constitution. 
The number of drug-enforcement weapons in the federal arsenal 
has increased steadily in the past twenty years. Forfeiture, one of the 
most powerful weapons recently enacted, draws on enforcement expe-
rience garnered during Prohibition.7 The civil drug forfeiture statute, 
21 U.S.C. § 881, enacted in 1970 and amended significantly in 1979 
and 1984, provides for an action in rem against any conveyance or real 
property used to facilitate any drug activity.8 In addition, property 
used in drug crimes may be forfeit under criminal forfeiture statutes,9 
or criminal forfeiture provisions in the RIC010 or continuing criminal 
enterprise11 statutes. 
Civil forfeiture, however, carries a unique potential for government 
abuse. In civil forfeiture, a criminal conviction is not required before a 
forfeiture may be ordered and the procedural protections present in 
criminal trials are absent. 12 By combining the conveyance, asset, and 
real property forfeiture provisions, the government, under section 881, 
7. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 5615(3)(C) (1988) (forfeiture of land on which an illegal distillery is 
located). 
8. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988) provides in relevant part: 
(a) The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property right 
shall exist in them: 
(4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or are in-
tended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, 
possession, or concealment of [illegal drugs] • . • • 
(6) All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value furnished or 
intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled substance in violation of 
this subchapter, all proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and all moneys, negotiable in-
struments, and securities used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of this sub-
chapter ...• 
(7) All real property, including any right, title, and interest (including any leasehold 
interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or improvements, 
which is used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the 
commission of, a violation of this subchapter punishable by more that one year's imprison-
ment. ..• 
9. 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988) (criminal forfeiture of property involved in drug activity). 
10. 18 u.s.c. § 1963 (1988). 
11. 21 u.s.c. § 848 (1988). 
12. See, e.g., One Blue 1977 AMC Jeep CJ-5 v. United States, 783 F.2d 759, 762 (8th Cir. 
1986) (criminal acquittal does not bar forfeiture); United States v. One Clipper Bow Ketch 
Nisku, 548 F.2d 8, 10 n.2 (1st Cir. 1977) (same); United States v. Property Identified as 3120 
Banneker Drive, N.E., Washington, D.C., 691 F. Supp. 497, 499 (D.D.C. 1988) (same). 
Civil forfeiture proceedings are conducted under the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admi-
ralty and Maritime Claims, FED. R. Civ. P. A - F. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(b) (1988). The form of 
action under the admiralty rules is against the property as wrongdoer, also known as a libel in 
rem. See FED. R. Clv. P. C(2); G. GILMORE & c. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY§§ 1-12 
(2d ed. 1975). The property may be seized without judicial review of the complaint. FED. R. 
CIV. P. C(3). The government bears only the burden of proving probable cause that the defend-
ant property is subject to forfeiture. Then, the burden of persuasion falls to the claimant to prove 
by preponderance of the evidence that the property is not subject to forfeiture or falls within one 
of the enumerated exceptions. See 21 U.S.C. § 88l(b), (d), (e) (1988). 
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can threaten to seize all of a person's property.13 
The circuits presently disagree over the scope of property subject 
to civil forfeiture. 14 Three circuits require a "substantial connection" 
between the conveyance or real property to be forfeit and the underly-
ing crime.15 These circuits assert that forfeiture is not justified where 
the connection between a conveyance or parcel of real property and 
the drug activity falls below a minimum threshold. Five other circuits 
have explicitly rejected this substantial connection test. 16 
This Note offers two justifications for narrowing the scope of sec-
tion 881 forfeiture.17 Part I argues that courts should apply the sub-
stantial connection test to section 881 forfeitures. This Part analyzes 
the statute using the traditional tools of statutory interpretation. 
While the text of the statute seems to support the broadest possible 
interpretation, the legislative history and context of adoption suggest 
that the substantial connection test is consistent with Congressional 
intent. In amending section 881, subsequent Congresses have favored 
application of the substantial connection test. Consistent with this 
narrower reading, present strategy in the "war on drugs" focuses stiff 
penalties on principal traffickers; individual users receive significantly 
13. In re Kingsley, 802 F.2d 571, 578 (1st Cir. 1986) (a broad application of the forfeiture 
statutes can result in seizing all of a defendant's property); United States v. $39,000 in Canadian 
Currency, 801 F.2d 1210, 1219 & n.7 (10th Cir. 1986) (noting the potential for police and 
prosecutorial abuse in civil forfeitures); United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1508-09 (10th 
Cir. 1988) (same). 
14. Because the provision for forfeiture of conveyances was enacted first, the split is most 
pronounced in that area, that is, cases falling under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) (1988). In 1970, 21 
U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) was enacted. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1276 (1970). In 1984, 21 U.S.C. 
§ 88l(a)(7) was enacted. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2050 (1984). 
15. See United States v. 1966 Beechcraft Aircraft Model King Air A90 Cream with Burg. & 
Gold Stripes, 777 F.2d 947 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. One 1976 Ford F-150 Pick-up, 769 
F.2d 525 (8th Cir. 1985); United States v. One 1972 Chevrolet Corvette, 625 F.2d 1026 (1st Cir. 
1980). Several cases also refer to the test as an attempt to find a "sufficient nexus" between the 
property and the underlying crime. See One 1972 Chevrolet Corvette, 625 F.2d at 1029. 
16. See United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate Commonly Known as 916 Douglas Ave-
nue, Elgin, ru., 903 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. One 1979 Porsche Coupe, 709 F.2d 
1424 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam); United States v. 1964 Beechcraft Baron Aircraft, TC-740, 
691 F.2d 725 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam), cerL denied, 461 U.S. 914 (1983); United States v. One 
1977 Lincoln Mark V. Coupe, 643 F.2d 154, 157 (3d Cir. 1981), cerL denied 454 U.S. 818 (1981); 
United States v. One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan, 548 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1977). 
Given the similar wordings of the conveyance and real property forfeiture provisions, the 
statutes have been and likely will continue to be interpreted similarly. See supra note 8. E.g., 
United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538 (4th Cir. 1989) (acknowledging that its decisions under 
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (real property forfeiture) will follow its decisions under 21 U.S.C. 
§ 881(a)(4) (forfeiture of conveyances)); see also Note, The Scope of Real Property Forfeiture 
Under 21 U.S.C § 881(a)(7}, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 303, 323 (1988). 
17. Several recent articles have addressed different aspects of civil forfeiture. See Goldsmith 
& Linderman, Asset Forfeiture and Third Party Rights: The Need for Further Law Refonn, 1989 
DUKE L.J. 1254; Note, Tempering the Relation-Back Doctrine: A More Reasonable Approach to 
Civil Forfeiture in Drug Cases, 76 VA. L. REV. 165 (1990); Special Project: Current Issues in 
Drug Enforcement Law, 43 V AND. L. REv. 1255 (1990). 
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more lenient treatment. Part II argues that eighth amendment18 re-
view should limit section 881 forfeiture. Section II.A argues that sec-
tion 881 forfeiture, despite its civil label, functions as a criminal 
punishment to which constitutional protections should be applied. 
Section II.B argues, in the alternative, that the history of the eighth 
amendment and recent Supreme Court analysis justifies eighth amend-
ment review in even purely civil cases where the government is the 
party seeking forfeiture. Finally, Part III engages each of the narrow-
ing processes. First, the substantial connection cases denying forfei-
ture are harmonized by development of a "second-degree facilitation" 
test. Second, this Part identifies the seeds of eighth amendment values 
in the substantial connection cases. Section III.C suggests the circum-
stances in and the methods by which courts should apply eighth 
amendment review to section 881 forfeiture. Applying these eighth 
amendment principles will protect the rights of claimants without im-
peding the effort to curtail drug trafficking. 
I. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
The text of section 881 seems to permit the broadest possible appli-
cation of forfeiture. This Part, however, argues that the substantial 
connection test fully comports with the statute's text, read within prin-
ciples of strict construction, and provides a better overall interpreta-
tion. The enacting Congress was primarily concerned with attacking 
large scale narcotics operations. Subsequent Congresses, in amending 
section 881, have indicated the propriety of the substantial connection 
test. In addition, interpreting the statute in the context of the present 
war on drugs suggests that an expansive reading of section 881 may be 
inconsistent with current values. 
A. The Text of the Statute t9 
Circuits rejecting the substantial connection test point directly to 
the text of the statute.20 On its face, section 881 appears to require the 
18. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted." U.S. CoNsr. amend. VIII. 
19. Statutory interpretation begins with the text. See, e.g., United States v. Turkette, 452 
U.S. 576, 586 (1981). Even scholars who propose interpretive schemes which look beyond the 
statute's text or the intent of the enacting legislature or both use the text as a boundary within 
which the interpretation must lie. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 81 
MICH. L. REv. 20, 60 (1988) ("It is crucial to see that while nautical models of statutory 
interpretation may be openly nonarcheologica/, they are not nontextual • • • Ultimately the 
question is, what is the most plausible meaning today that these words will bear."); Eskridge, 
Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479, 1496 (1987) ("In many cases, the 
text of the statute will provide determinate answers . . . . In general, the more detailed the text is, 
the greater weight the interpreter will give to the textual considerations •.•• "). 
20. United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate Commonly Known as 916 Douglas Avenue, 
Elgin, Ill., 903 F.2d 490, 492 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. 1964 Beechcraft Baron Aircraft 
TC740, 691 F.2d 725, 727 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 914 (1983); United 
States v. One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan, 548 F.2d 421, 423 (2d Cir. 1977). 
October 1990] Note-Na"owing Civil Drug Forfeiture 169 
broadest possible scope for forfeiture.21 Subsections 88l(a)(4) and 
881(a)(7) provide for forfeiture of property used "in any manner" to 
facilitate the underlying drug crime.22 
Section 881 appears to have been modeled on a prior forfeiture 
statute covering much of the same ground. In language similar to sec-
tion 881, 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 781-78223 provide for the forfeiture of ves-
sels, vehicles, and aircraft used in drug crimes. While "[l]anguage in 
one statute usually sheds little light upon the meaning of different lan-
guage in another statute ... ,"24 the language in section 881 differs 
primarily in the inclusion of the phrase "in any manner." If section 
881 was enacted with sections 781 and 782 in mind, the single phrase 
alteration might have substantive meaning. The circuits rejecting the 
substantial connection test have noted this different language in their 
expansive reading of section 881.25 At first blush, their expansive 
reading may be necessary to avoid rendering section 881 redundant 
with sections 781-782. 
This argument, however, assumes both explicit legislative consid-
eration of the prior statute and a specific intended meaning for the 
phrase "in any manner." Neither assumption is justified. First, the 
legislative history of section 881 is devoid of reference to section 781.26 
In 1970, Congress was deliberating a "comprehensive" drug abuse and 
enforcement act.27 The duplication of the section 781-782 enforce-
ment provisions in section 881 could be explained by Congress' desire 
21. See supra note 8. 
22. See supra note 8. As the opinion in One Parcel .•. Commonly Known as 916 Douglas 
Avenue demonstrates, courts which refuse to look beyond the "plain meaning" of the statute will 
be inclined against the substantial connection test. 903 F.2d at 492-96. This Part implicitly 
suggests that other evidence better illuminates Congressional intent. Additionally, the words of 
section 881 should be read as words defined by similar words in a previous drug forfeiture stat-
ute. Hence, plain meaning is inappropriate. See infra notes 23-34 and accompanying text. 
23. The statutes provide: "It shall be unlawful ... to use any vessel, vehicle, or aircraft to 
facilitate the transportation, carriage, conveyance, concealment, receipt, possession, purchase, 
sale, barter, exchange, or giving away of any contraband article." 49 U.S.C. app. § 78l(a)(3) 
(1982). "Any vessel, vehicle, or aircraft which has been or is being used in violation of any 
provision of section 781 of this Appendix, or in, upon, or by means of which any violation of said 
section has taken or is taking place, shall be seized and forfeited .... " 49 U.S.C. app. § 782 
(1982). 49 U.S.C. §§ 781-782 were enacted in 1939. Act of Aug. 9, 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-357, 53 
Stat. 1291, 1291-92. 
24. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 25 (1984). But see Communication Workers of 
America v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 745 (1988) (nearly identical language of Railway Labor Act 
section and National Labor Relations Act section compelled identical interpretation despite gen-
eral rule against reading the statutes together). 
25. See, e.g., United States v. One 1979 Mercury Cougar XR-7, 666 F.2d 228, 230 (5th Cir. 
1982); United States v. One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan, 548 F.2d 421, 423-25 (2d Cir. 1977). 
26. See generally H.R. REP. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE 
CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4566 [hereinafter 1970 HOUSE REPORT]; 116 CONG. REC. 33603-67, 
35050, 35051-58, 35477-90, 35494-96, 35516-23, 35549-59 (1970). 
27. The House Committee wrote, 
This legislation is designed to deal in a comprehensive fashion with the growing menace 
of drug abuse in the United States (1) through providing authority for increased efforts in 
drug abuse prevention and rehabilitation of users, (2) through providing more effective 
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to include all programs and penalties in a single bill. Had sections 781 
and 782 been at the forefront of Congress' consideration, those stat-
utes would likely have been amended, or, at least, would have been 
discussed in the legislative history. In fact, section 881 seems to have 
commanded little of the enacting Congress' attention; the main de-
bates occurred over the theory of punishment to be followed28 and the 
desirability and constitutionality of "no-knock" warrants.29 
Second, if Congress did desire section 881 to broaden the scope of 
property subject to forfeiture, this conclusion does not require rejec-
tion of the substantial connection test. Courts had construed sections 
781-782 extremely narrowly. In general, these cases rejected forfeiture 
of vehicles which had clearly facilitated a drug transaction, but had 
not been part of the actual drug crime. In the typical case, the courts 
refused to order forfeiture of vehicles which had provided transporta-
tion to negotiations and did not transport the drugs after the sale. 30 
Congress, therefore, may have been pointing at transportation to or 
from the scene of the negotiations or crime by inclusion of the phrase 
"in any manner." This conclusion does not invalidate the substantial 
connection test. The Eighth Circuit, which has adopted the substan-
tial connection test, has also held that section 881 supports forfeiture 
of vehicles used to transport traffickers to preliminary negotiations.31 
Other circuits have avoided the issue by holding that, even under the 
substantial connection standard, a vehicle used solely for transporta-
tion would be subject to forfeiture. 32 In fact, the Fifth Circuit has 
characterized the forfeitability of conveyances used for negotiations as 
the primary difference between section 881 and sections 781 and 782.33 
The substantial connection test invalidates forfeiture only in circum-
stances where the conveyance or real property is even less connected 
than transportation to negotiations. 34 
means for law enforcement aspects of drug abuse prevention and control, and (3) by provid-
ing for an overall balanced scheme of criminal penalties for offenses involving drugs. 
1970 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 26, at 2, reprinted at 4567. See also id. at 5, reprinted at 4571 
(Many pieces of legislation enacted at various times have "necessarily given rise to a confusing 
and often duplicative approach . • . • This bill collects and conforms these diverse laws in one 
piece of legislation •... "). 
28. 1970 HousE REPORT, supra note 26, at 9-12, reprinted at 4575-79 (noting the debate over 
retributive and rehabilitative punishment schemes); see also 116 CoNG. REc. 35,477-83 (1970). 
29. See, e.g., 1970 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 26, at 86-89, reprinted at 4653-57; 116 CONG. 
REc. 35,523-40, 33,603-67 (1970). 
30. See, e.g., Howard v. United States, 423 F.2d 1102, 1103 (9th Cir. 1970) (refusing to 
forfeit vehicle which had been driven to meet the car transporting drugs, but never itself con· 
tained drugs); Platt v. United States, 163 F.2d 165, 167 (10th Cir. 1947) (refusal to forfeit the car 
used to drive to the pharmacy where defendant attempted to have fraudulent prescriptions filled). 
31. See One Blue 1977 AMC Jeep CJ-5 v. United States, 783 F.2d 759, 762 (8th Cir. 1986). 
32. See, e.g., United States v. One 1984 Cadillac, 888 F.2d 1133, 1137-38 (6th Cir. 1989}; 
United States v. One 1979 Porsche Coupe, 709 F.2d 1424, 1427 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam). 
33. See United States v. One 1979 Mercury Cougar XR-7, 666 F.2d 228, 230 (5th Cir. 1982); 
United States v. One 1977 Cadillac Coupe de Ville, 644 F.2d 500, 501-02 (5th Cir. 1981). 
34. See infra section III.A. 
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Although the plain language of section 881 might seem to reject 
the substantial connection test, reading the phrase "in any manner" 
against the narrow scope of sections 781-782, indicates that Congress' 
desire to expand forfeiture may have stopped short of such a broad 
command. To choose between these interpretations, the context of 
adoption, the explicit statements of the enacting Congress, and other 
extrinsic sources of legislative history must be surveyed. 
B. Rules of Strict Construction 
When confronted with ambiguous statutes, courts often resort to 
rules of construction to guide interpretation. While these canons are 
capable of manipulation, each stands for a substantive proposition the 
courts seek to uphold. In evaluating section 881, two canons may aid 
interpretation. First, since the coercive power of the state is impli-
cated, criminal statutes should be construed narrowly.35 Second, 
courts should favor readings which avoid potential constitutional con-
flicts. Because forfeiture is a penalty imposed on participants in illegal 
drug activities, and its application to legitimately acquired convey-
ances and real property implicates eighth amendment protections, 36 
section 881 ought to be narrowly construed. 
In general, criminal statutes are strictly construed in favor of the 
defendant. 37 The Supreme Court has defended this rule of construc-
tion based on principles of fair notice to potential defendants and pre-
vention of police abuse. 38 Early forfeiture cases explicitly adopted this 
standard. In 1875, in Farmers' and Mechanics' National Bank v. 
Dearing, 39 the Supreme Court wrote: "Forfeitures are not favored in 
the law. Courts always incline against them. When either of two con-
structions can be given to a statute, and one of them involves a forfei-
ture, the other is to be preferred."40 Similarly, in a Prohibition-era 
case, the Supreme Court reiterated that "[f]orfeitures are not favored; 
they should be enforced only when within both the letter and spirit of 
the law."41 Circuit courts also have applied generally the rule of strict 
construction both in interpreting forfeiture statutes42 and in determin-
35. Despite Congress' designation of§ 881 as a civil forfeiture remedy, it is in fact a criminal 
penalty. See infra section III.A. The present section avoids the problem of characterizing the 
statute by considering only court pronouncements explicitly specifying the standard of interpre-
tation of forfeiture provisions. 
36. See infra Part II. 
37. See, e.g., w. EsKRIDGE & P. F'RICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: 
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 658 (1988); 3 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES 
AND STATUTORY CoNSTRUCTION § 59.03 (4th ed. 1974). 
38. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (invalidating 
vagrancy statute as unconstitutionally vague). 
39. 91 U.S. 29 (1875). 
40. 91 U.S. at 35 (citations omitted). 
41. United States v. One 1936 Model Ford V-8 De Luxe Coach, 307 U.S. 219, 226 (1939). 
42. See, e.g., United States v. McKeithen, 822 F.2d 310, 315 (2d Cir. 1987) (applying the rule 
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ing whether the property in a specific case should be forfeit under the 
accepted interpretation.43 Since the text of section 881 can be read to 
support both the substantial connection test and a more expansive 
reading, the narrow construction should be preferred. 
Still, Supreme Court pronouncements regarding interpretation of 
forfeiture statutes have not been uniform. In the cases advocating 
broader interpretation, however, the Court was faced with statutes 
which mandated only the forfeiture of per se illegal goods.44 In United 
States v. Stowell, 45 the Court interpreted the forfeiture statute in ques-
tion, arguing that "statutes to prevent frauds upon the revenue are 
considered as enacted for the public good and to suppress a public 
wrong .... "46 Although the forfeiture constituted a penalty, the stat-
ute ought "not to be construed, like penal laws generally, strictly in 
favor of the defendant; but they are to be fairly and reasonably con-
strued, so as to cairy out the intention of the legislature."47 The for-
feiture of goods on which tax has not been paid more clearly 
represents a purely remedial action. The statute implies that no prop-
erty rights arise until the importation tax is paid. By contrast, section 
881, in many cases, extinguishes the claimant's property right in legiti-
mately acquired property. While section 881 certainly was enacted 
"for the public good and to suppress a public wrong," all criminal 
of strict construction to criminal forfeiture under the Continuing Criminal Enterprise Act, 21 
U.S.C. § 848 (1982)); United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911, 914 (3d Cir. 1981) (same); United 
States v. Charles D. Kaier Co., 61 F.2d 160, 162 (3d Cir. 1932) ("The power to condemn or to 
declare a forfeiture must be found in the statutes, and such statutes must be pursued with reason-
able strictness."). 
43. See, e.g., United States v. One 1957 Rockwell Aero Commander 680 Aircraft, 671 F.2d 
414, 417 (10th Cir. 1982); United States v. One (1) 1975 Thunderbird, 576 F.2d 834, 836 (10th 
Cir. 1978). 
44. This distinction will recur in this Note. The difference between a statute which confis-
cates goods in which the claimant never had a property right (e.g., the marijuana itself) and a 
statute which extinguishes a legitimately acquired property right characterizes the forfeiture as a 
civil or criminal penalty and as either remedial or punitive. Cf. Darmstadter & Mackoff, Some 
Constitutional and Practical Considerations of Civil Forfeiture Under 21 U.S. C. § 881, 9 WHIT· 
TIER L. REV. 27, 30-31 (1987). Darmstadter and Mackoffsuggest a division between the drugs 
as malum in se and conveyances and assets as derivative properties. While substantially agreeing 
with their position, this Note departs from Darmstadter and Mackoff's treatment by advocating 
heightened protections for any property which may have been acquired legitimately. Darm-
stadter and Mackoff group together for lesser protection "[a]ny money or other property that has 
been acquired through the sale of drugs, or intended to be used to purchase drugs, are the fruits 
of, or have been tainted by an illegal transaction." Id. at 31. Only conveyances are accorded 
heightened protection by Darmstadter and Mackoff. Id. Further, this Note proposes that extin-
guishing legitimately acquired property rights requires constitutional protection and should be 
evaluated as a fine under the eighth amendment. See infra Part II. This Note also differs with 
the scheme advanced in Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures: A Framework for 
Constitutional Analysis, 60 MINN. L. REV. 379, 475-80 (1976). Clark looks to the purposes for 
which the property was acquired and the persons from whom it was acquired, instead of focusing 
on the means by which property rights, if any, were acquired. 
45. 133 U.S. 1 (1890). 
46. 133 U.S. at 12. 
47. 133 U.S. at 12. 
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statutes fall within this rubric. The exception would swallow the rule; 
the policies of notice and restraint of the police power would be lost. 
Additionally, section 881 does not function as a typical civil penalty, 
the severity of which is determined by the damages caused by each 
violation. 48 
The Supreme Court recently applied a broad interpretation rule to 
RICO forfeiture.49 The Court, however, relied in part on the explicit 
congressional command of liberal interpretation.so RICO forfeiture, 
moreover, only reaches tainted parts of the enterprise. si Legitimately 
acquired property or businesses are not forfeited. 
A second canon of statutory construction, avoiding constitutional 
issues, also supports a narrow interpretation of section 881. "Assum-
ing that the legislature is loathe to come close to enacting unconstitu-
tional criminal statutes, courts will construe criminal penalties 
narrowly enough so that there is no question of the statute's constitu-
tionality .... "s2 While this canon has been the subject of criticism,s3 
it should be applied to interpreting section 881. Judicial action in this 
area is justified by the very real need for constitutional protections. s4 
Canons of interpretation are best applied when two plausible inter-
pretations of the statute are supportable by the text and its legislative 
history.ss Here, however, the text of section 881 points toward a 
broad interpretation while the legislative history favors the narrower, 
substantial connection interpretation. Nonetheless, as the division in 
the circuits demonstrates, both interpretations are plausible readings 
of section 881. The rule of narrowly construing penal statutes and the 
presumption that legislative enactments are constitutional provide 
principled bases for selecting between the competing readings. In this 
situation, these canons strongly suggest that the narrower substantial 
connection test should apply in section 881 cases. 
C. The Context of Adoption 
In attempting to determine the meaning or purpose sought by the 
48. See infra notes 160-69 and accompanying text. 
49. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 27 (1983). 
50. 464 U.S. at 27. Section 904 of Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, required liberal interpre-
tation to effectuate the "remedial" purposes of RICO. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1988) (annotation). 
51. See infra notes 295-98 and accompanying text. 
52. W. EsKRIDGE & P. F'RICKEY, supra note 37, at 676. 
53. Eskridge and Frickey note the following major criticisms: 1. The rule is employed only 
when it reaches the predetermined result the court seeks; 2. The rule creates a second plane of 
judicial activism, upsetting the intent of the legislature not only when the statute is unconstitu-
tional, but also when it might be. Id. at 689 (citing H. FRIENDLY, Mr. Justice Frankfurter & the 
Reading of Statutes, in BENCHMARKS 211-12 (1967) (proposition number 1) and R. POSNER, 
THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 285 (1985) (proposition number 2)). 
54. Part II will demonstrate that § 881 forfeiture gives rise to genuine eighth amendment 
concerns. 
55. W. EsKRIDGE & P. F'RICKEY, supra note 37, at 694. 
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enacting Congress, an interpreter should consider the atmosphere and 
pressures under which the legislators were working. Henry M. Hart 
and Albert Sacks advocate identifying instances in which the enacting 
Congress clearly would have thought the statute applied, and then rea-
soning from these examples to cases the legislature probably did not 
consider directly.56 Approaching statutory interpretation from a law-
and-economics perspective, Judge Posner argues that the context of 
adoption should be determined in order to preserve the bargains 
struck between various legislators and between the legislators and in-
volved interest groups. 57 Under these approaches, the pressures on 
and motivations of the enacting Congress inform interpretation. 
The Congress that originally enacted section 88158 was clearly con-
cerned with the scope of organized drug trafficking.59 The solution it 
adopted, however, does not evidence a purely punitive approach, an 
approach which would justify reading the forfeiture provision as 
broadly as possible. The attack mounted by the Comprehensive Drug 
Abuse Prevention and Education Act of 197060 contained three main 
programs: (1) education; (2) rehabilitation; and (3) enforcement. 
Even in the enforcement arena, the statute focused on rehabilitation, 
rather than purely punitive measures. 61 Fines and penalties were de-
creased in some areas.62 Additionally, section 881 contained three ex-
ceptions to mandatory forfeiture. First, conveyances owned by 
common carriers could not be forfeit so long as the carrier had no 
knowledge of illegal use. 63 Second, the property of innocent owners 
was not subject to forfeiture. 64 Third, the statute incorporated provi-
sions for administrative remission and mitigation. 65 
The legislation's overall plan indicates Congress directed the most 
severe measures at large scale drug traffickers. 66 The evidence sug-
gests the enacting Congress intended forfeiture to apply to large scale 
56. See generally H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (tent. ed. 1958); see also w. 
EsKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, supra note 37, at 576 (interpreting Hart and Sacks' approach). 
57. R. POSNER, supra note 53, at 286-89. 
58. Treating the 1970 Congress, which enacted the conveyance forfeiture statute, 21 U.S.C. 
§ 881(a)(4), as the enacting Congress is appropriate because the real property forfeiture statute, 
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988), is worded nearly equivalently. See supra note 8. 
59. 1970 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 26, at 6, reprinted at 4566, 4572 ("Drug abuse in the 
United States is a problem of ever-increasing concern, and appears to be approaching epidemic 
proportions."); id. at 22, 30, reprinted at 4588, 4596. The findings and declarations of the bill 
focus on the traffic in illegal drugs. Id. at 30, reprinted at 4596. 
60. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1227 (1970). 
61. 1970 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 26, at 9-10, reprinted at 4575. 
62. Id. at 11, reprinted at 4576. 
63. 21 U.S.C. § 88l(a)(4)(A) (1988). 
64. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)(C), (6), (7) (1988); cf Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing 
Co., 416 U.S. 663, 689 (1974). 
65. 21 U.S.C. § 88l(d) (1988) (incorporating by reference 19 U.S.C. § 1618 (1988)), 
66. See 1970 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 26, at 10-11, reprinted at 4575-77. 
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drug traffickers and their operations. The legislation focused on de-
priving criminals of the profits of their trade - an attack on persons 
who make a living from drug trafficking. The exceptions, for common 
carriers and innocent third parties, demonstrate concern that those 
unwittingly involved in drug transactions not have their property con-
fiscated. The cases typically addressed by the substantial connection 
test, of apparently minimal involvement in drug trafficking or the ex-
tinguishment of legitimately acquired property rights, fall between 
these two extremes. The total scheme of the 1970 Act, however, in 
adopting rehabilitative and lenient measures, may indicate that Con-
gress would have been reluctant to forfeit property of all persons con-
nected with any drug crime. 67 
D. Explicit Statements of the Enacting Congress 68 
The committee reports accompanying section 881 indicate no clear 
intent for the scope of forfeiture. The House Report, for example, 
does not discuss the forfeiture provision other than to provide a brief 
summary of the statute. 69 In fact, the report does not even recite the 
purpose of the forfeiture provisions. The little evidence in the report, 
however, suggests a narrow scope for section 881. Discussing the for-
feiture provision, the committee wrote, 
Subsection (a) of this section sets forth the conditions for forfeiture 
and the property to be forfeited. These include all controlled substances 
produced or obtained in violation of the act, all raw materials, products, 
and equipment used, or intended for use, in manufacturing, handling, or 
67. Examination of§ 881 as it presently reads might indicate that§ 88l(a)(4) should cover 
the intermediate cases because§ 881(a)(6) provides for forfeiture of all drug profits and all assets 
purchased with those profits. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988); see supra note 8 for relevant text. 
Section 881(a)(6), however, was not adopted until 1978, see infra notes 83-92 and accompanying 
text, and therefore is of no assistance in determining the intent of the 1970 Congress. Further, 
the 1978 Congress explicitly discussed the substantial connection test, indicating its appropriate-
ness. See infra notes 83-92 and accompanying text. 
68. The next step in traditional statutory interpretation is to look to legislative 
pronouncements of intent. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 19, at 23-24 (outlining the methods of 
traditional statutory interpretation). Data here include problems· acknowledged by Congress in 
hearings and debates and pronouncements made by the committees in their reports on the 
legislation. By piecing together this data, the interpreter will attempt to determine the problems 
the statute sought to solve and use that conclusion to assist in the present controversy. See W. 
EsKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, supra note 37, at 709 ("Most scholars and judges agree that committee 
reports should be considered as authoritative legislative history and should be given great weight 
.••. "). But see Aleinikoff, supra note 19, at 29 ("[L]egislative reports once written to inform 
legislators about pending legislation, and legislative floor debates once intended to provide a 
forum for deliberation, are now primarily constructed to influence future interpreters."); 
Eskridge, Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REv. 67, 95 n.164 (1988) ("As legislators 
and lobbyists have begun to understand how much courts use legislative history, posturing and 
fabrication have become possible. The fight, if lost on the language of the statute, moves to the 
language of the committee report or perhaps to getting a scripted colloquy entered into the 
Congressional Record.") Cf. R. POSNER, supra note 53, at 269 ("But if legislators know that 
courts look to legislative history in interpreting statutes - and they do know this - then when 
they vote for a bill they are assenting, in a sense, to at least some of what is in that history."). 
69. 1970 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 26, at 55-56, reprinted at 4623-24. 
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conveying controlled substances in violation of the act and any container 
for property previously described. Also subject to forfeiture are all con-
veyances used, or intended for use, to transport or conceal such violative 
property.70 
Under this interpretation, the conveyance could only be forfeit when 
used or intended for use in transporting or storing the illegal drugs. 
For example, an automobile which drug dealers used for transporta-
tion to negotiations would not be forfeitable. Similarly, property on 
which a drug transaction actually occurred would not be forfeitable, 
so long as the property did not "conceal" the drugs. This reading is 
actually narrower than the substantial connection test. 71 Combined 
with the evidence of a multi-level attack by the enacting Congress, 72 
this language indicates a narrow interpretation would comport more 
closely with Congress' intent. 
E. Subsequent Consideration of the Statute 
Legislative reexamination of the statute may also provide clues for 
interpretation.73 Later congressional consideration of section 881 fur-
ther bolsters the case for narrowing its reach. Data from subsequent 
Congresses generally include amendments and repeals introduced and 
never passed, hearings held and action subsequently taken, reports on 
the effectiveness of a statute, and floor debate in response to court de-
cisions. 74 At the least, pronouncements by succeeding Congresses re-
garding the meaning of a statute may deserve weight out of respect for 
Congress' democratic nature. 75 
The Supreme Court has given varying weight to pronouncements 
of subsequent Congresses. In United States v. Price, 76 for example, the 
Court wrote, "[T]he views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous 
basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one."77 On the other hand, 
70. Id. at 55, reprinted at 4623. The Senate report uses substantially similar language in 
discussing the forfeiture provision of the Senate bill. S. REP. No. 613, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 32 
(1969). 
71. Even under the substantial connection test, courts commonly allow forfeiture of convey-
ances where they transported a drug dealer to the scene of a transaction, whether drugs are 
actually present in the car or not. See, e.g., United States v. 1966 Beechcraft Aircraft Model 
King Air A90 Cream with Burg & Gold Stripes, 777 F.2d 947, 953 (4th Cir. 1985) ("[T]he use of 
an airplane or other vehicle or vessel in a drug transaction, either to transport controlled sub-
stances or to transport conspirators to an exchange site, establishes a 'substantial connection' 
between the conveyance and the criminal activity sufficient to justify an order of forfeiture."); see 
also infra section III.A. 
72. See supra notes 58-67 and accompanying text. 
73. w. EsKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, supra note 37, at 757-59. 
74. See generally, ·Farber, Statutory Interpretation, Legislative Inaction, and Civil Rights, 87 
MICH. L. REV. 1 (1987). 
75. See w. EsKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, supra note 37, at 759. 
76. 361 U.S. 304 (1960). 
77. 361 U.S. at 313; see also United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23, 33 n.9 (1980) ("[T]he views 
of some Congressmen as to the construction of a statute adopted years before by another Con-
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the Court, especially at times when the meaning of the' statute is un-
clear, has been willing to accord "significant weight" to statements 
made by subsequent Congresses.78 The Court acknowledges "[w]here 
the mind labours to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes 
everything from which aid can be derived."79 Because the text and 
legislative history of section 881 can support either the substantial 
connection test or a broader reading, subsequent legislative pro-
nouncements should be considered. Members of subsequent Con-
gresses likely were not biased against the original weight assigned to 
various factors by the enacting Congress. 80 The original drug statute 
embodied an attempt to confront a public problem; subsequent inter-
pretations of the statute by the legislature were no less likely addressed 
to the same problems. 81 The congressional statements in evidence 
here are taken from the history of legislation evaluating and amending 
section 881. 82 
Section 881 has been amended substantively three times since the 
enactment of the conveyance forfeiture provision. Congressional 
statements made during consideration of two of these amendments 
provide strong evidence that the substantial connection test should be 
employed in applying section 881. In the first reconsideration, in 
1978, Congress added an asset forfeiture provision.83 Commenting on 
the asset forfeiture amendment, the joint committee report contained 
the following language, which many of the courts requiring a substan-
tial connection have quoted with approval:84 
Due to the penal nature of forfeiture statutes, it is the intent of these 
gress have 'very little, if any, significance.' ") (quoting Rainwater v. United States, 356 U.S. 590, 
593 (1958)); R. POSNER, supra note 57, at 279 (giving weight to post enactment statements will 
upset the original "deal" that produced the legislation). 
78. See, e.g., Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572, 596 (1980) ("[W]hile 
the views of subsequent Congresses cannot override the unmistakable intent of the enacting one, 
such views are entitled to significant weight, and particularly so when the precise intent of the 
enacting Congress is obscure.'') (citations omit_ted). 
79. Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 446 U.S. 657, 666 n.8 (1980) (quoting United States v. Fisher, 6 
U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 386 (1805)). 
80. Cf. R. POSNER, supra note 53, at 279 ("I do not want to anathematize completely the use 
of postenactment materials to interpret a statute, because such materials may in some cases re-
flect a disinterested and informed view by a committee that is monitoring the administration of a 
statute; the problem is to identify those cases.''). 
81. Given the increasing attention accorded to illegal drugs, subsequent Congresses probably 
were, if anything, predisposed toward broader interpretations. 
82. In other words, the statements do not constitute the mere opinion oflegislators seeking to 
influence courts or the public when they have not been able to prevail in Congress. See supra 
note 68. Additionally, the context moves these subsequent statements closer to the model of 
subsequent legislation, which the Court has more consistently given "great weight.'' See South 
Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S 367, 379 n.17 (1984) (pointing at subsequent legislation, more than 
subsequent statements, as deserving "great weight"). · 
83. Pub. L. No. 95-633, § 301, 92 Stat. 3768, 3777 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988)); 
see supra note 8 for relevant text. 
84. See United ·states v. 1966 Beechcraft Aircraft Model King Air A90 Cream with Burg & 
Gold Stripes, 777 F.2d 947, 953 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. One 1972 Chevrolet Corvette, 
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provisions that property would be forfeited only if there is a substantial 
connection between the property and the underlying criminal activity 
which the statute seeks to prevent .... Similarly, any moneys, negotiable 
instruments, or securities that were used or intended to be used to facili-
tate any violation of the Controlled Substances Act would be forf eitable 
only if they had some substantial connection to, or were instrumental in, 
the commission of the underlying criminal activity which the statute 
seeks to prevent. 85 
This statement strongly suggests the substantial connection test best 
reflects Congress' intent. 
Courts refusing to follow this history note the lack of similar his-
tory for the conveyance forfeiture provision. In United States v. 1964 
Beechcraft Baron Aircraft, TC-740, 86 the Fifth Circuit wrote that sec-
tion 88l(a)(6)'s "legislative history makes no mention of using the 
same test for other forfeiture actions and the legislative history of 
§ 881 [(a)(4) and (a)(7)] is devoid of any mention of a 'substantial con-
nection' test. " 87 The Fifth Circuit might have added that the text of 
section 88l(a)(6) does not include the phrase "in any manner."88 This 
distinction gives strong textual support to a refusal to read the sub-
stantial connection test into the conveyance and real property forfei-
ture provisions. 
This argument, while strong, does not provide sufficient ground for 
rejecting the substantial connection test. First, the committee report 
does not seem to be discussing the amendment exclusively. The first 
sentence, referring to substantial connection, addresses the entire for-
feiture statute. The committee's statement that "similarly" the new 
provision allows forfeiture of moneys only if it bears a substantial con-
nection indicates the prior reference is to section 88l(a)(4), the con-
veyance forfeiture provision. The committee report seems to be first 
explaining that section (a)(4) only applies when a substantial connec-
tion is found and, second, stating that the same standard will apply to 
the proposed section (a)(6). As corroboration, the same joint explana-
tory statement elsewhere described the existing forfeiture statute 
narrowly. 
The types of property covered under the current law includes illicit 
abusable drugs, raw materials and equipment used in manufacturing 
such drugs, property used to contain or conceal such drugs, vehicles 
used to facilitate the transportation of such drugs, and any records, 
625 F.2d 1026, 1029 (1st Cir. 1980); see also United States v. One 1980 Bertram 58' Motor 
Yacht, 876 F.2d 884, 889 (11th Cir. 1989) (Vance, J., dissenting). 
85. Joint Explanatory Statement of Titles II and Ill 124 CONG. REc. S17647 (daily ed. Oct. 
7, 1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CoDE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 9518, 9522 [hereinafter 1978 
Joint Explanatory Statement]. 
86. 691 F.2d 725 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 914 (1983). 
87. 691 F.2d at 727. 
88. See supra note 8. 
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books, or formulas used in violation of Federal illicit drug laws. 89 
This statement, while general, mirrors the interpretation given the 
statute by the enacting Congress90 and requires that the conveyance or 
real property actually be used in the transportation or concealment of 
the illegal drugs. These two statements, in combination, demonstrate 
that the amending Congress believed the substantial connection test 
should apply to forfeitures of conveyances. 
Second, the purpose of section 881; attacking drug trafficking's 
profits and instrumentalities, contradicts the Fifth Circuit's distinction 
between asset forfeiture and conveyance forfeiture. As early as 1950, 
the Congress recognized the need to focus on the profits and instru-
mentalities of the drug suppliers. 
Enforcement officers of the Government have found that one of the 
best ways to strike at commercialized crime is through the pocketbooks 
of the criminals who engage in it. Vessels, vehicles, and aircraft may be 
termed the operating tools of dope peddlers, and often represent major 
capital investments to criminals whose liquid assets, if any, are fre-
quently not accessible to the Government. Seizure and forfeiture of 
these means of transportation provide an effective brake on the traffic in 
narcotic drugs.91 
Given this concern, especially with seizing liquid assets, Congress 
would not have enacted a stricter standard for forfeiture of cash than 
for conveyances.92 Both the explicit language of the amending com-
mittee's report and the purpose of section 881 forfeiture establish that 
the amending Congress believed the substantial connection test should 
apply. 
The enactment of the real property forfeiture provision, as part of 
89. 1978 Joint Explanatory Statement, supra note 85, reprinted at 9522. 
90. See supra sections I.C - 1.D. 
91. HOUSE CoMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, H.R. REP. No. 2751, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3, re-
printed in 1950 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS. 2952, 2953. This purpose was judicially 
recognized in United States v. One 1972 Datsun, 378 F. Supp. 1200, 1205 (D.N.H. 1974). 
92. That conveyances and property can be traced and seized more easily than cash does not 
justify seizing them as surrogates. First, the inability to identify specific illegally generated pro-
ceeds casts doubt on the existence of criminal activity. Second, since the conveyance or real 
property often is acquired legitimately, greater protections, not lesser, are necessary in those 
cases. 
The distinction drawn supra note 44, between property that may never be legitimately owned 
and property legitimately acquired but forfeit by virtue of illegal use, can be expanded. Section 
881(a)(6) applies to assets that both are to be furnished for and are derived from illegal narcotics 
transactions. 21 U.S.C. § 88l(a)(6) (1988). Money acquired by sale of narcotics, which may 
never be owned legally, clearly is forfeitable. When money acquired legitimately is forfeit be-
cause it was intended to purchase narcotics, the courts should view this as an extinguishment of 
the legitimate property right and should use special care. Separating these seemingly similar 
transactions for different treatment actually requires the government to establish the same proof 
in each case. In order to show that money is derived from a drug transaction, a transaction must 
be shown. In other words, the government must establish illegal activity. Where no transaction 
has occurred, the government should be held to the higher burden of showing its contemplation. 
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the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984,93 occasioned the second 
important reexamination of the conveyance forfeiture provision. This 
legislation was prompted in large part by the 1981 publication of a 
General Accounting Office Report criticizing the nonuse of forfeiture 
statutes.94 In its hearings and reports, the amending committee identi-
fied as the existing statutes' primary failings the limited scope of RICO 
forfeiture and the inability to reach real property under the civil forfei-
ture provisions.95 Notably absent from discussion was the "substan-
tial connection" test.96 The committee report summarized section 
881's perceived failings: · 
The extent of drug-related property subject to civil forfeiture under 21 
U.S.C. 881 is also too limited in one respect. Under current law, if a 
person uses a boat or car to transport narcotics or uses equipment to 
manufacture dangerous drugs, [the drug dealer's] use of the property 
renders it subject to civil forfeiture. But if [the drug dealer] uses a se· 
eluded barn to store tons of marihuana or uses his house as a manufac-
turing laboratory for amphetamines, there is no provision to subject [the] 
real property to civil forfeiture, even though its use was indispensable to 
the commission of a major drug offense and the prospect of the forfeiture 
of the property would have been a powerful deterrent. 97 
The committees demonstrated their awareness of the state of forfeiture 
law, both at the circuit and district level.98 While the committee state-
ments do not comment specifically on the substantial connection test, 
the committee's general awareness of the state of forfeiture law com-
bined with the commitment to increase the scope of forfeiture law99 
implies the committee would have at least discussed, if not altered, the 
law had the substantial connection test been viewed with disfavor. 100 
93. Pub. L. 98-473, 98 Stat.'2050 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7)); see supra note 8 for 
relevant text. 
94. CoMPTROLLER GEN., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AssET FORFEITURE - A SEL· 
DOM USED TOOL IN CoMBATTING DRUG TRAFFICKING (1981). 
95. See SENATE CoMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, CoMPREHENSIVE FORFEITURE Acr OF 1983, 
S. REP. No. 224, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 17. 
96. By this time, the First and Second Circuits had formulated the substantial connection 
test. See United States v. One 1972 Chevrolet Corvette, 625 F.2d 1026 (1st Cir. 1980); United 
States v. One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan, 548 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1977). 
97. SENATE CoMM. ON CoNTINUING APPROPRIATIONS, 1985, COMPREHENSIVE CRIME 
CoNTROL Acr OF 1984, s. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 195, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE 
CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3378 [hereinafter 1984 SENATE REPORT]. 
98. See, e.g., SENATE CoMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 95, at 17 n.18 (noting circuit 
decisions construing the scope of RICO forfeiture narrowly); id. at 22-23 nn.24-27 (citing circuit 
court decisions interpreting RICO forfeiture). 
99. See SENATE CoMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 95, at 14 ("In recent years the Jus-
tice Department and other Federal agencies have made a concerted effort to increase the use of 
forfeiture in narcotics and racketeering cases. This bill is intended to eliminate the statutory 
limitations and ambiguities that have frustrated the active pursuit of forfeiture ...• "). 
100. Interpreting direct silence is, of course, a tricky matter, and this piece of evidence proba-
bly should be accorded less weight. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 
671-73 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Farber, supra note 74, at 10 ("Silence is an imperfect signal 
of congressional approval. Nevertheless, silence clearly communicates some information ••• ,"). 
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F. A Dynamic Interpretation of Section 8811°1 
Careful reflection on current public sentiment does not support the 
extremely broad reading of section 881 that courts rejecting the sub-
stantial connection test adopt. Drug trafficking and abuse are signifi-
cant current problems. This section does not attempt to refute that 
fact. Rather, this section attempts to demonstrate that the evidence 
does not all point in the same direction. Current policies and attitudes 
do draw distinctions between types of drug offenses and offenders. 
Presently, section 881 doctrine makes no distinctions between classes 
of offenders.102 The substantial connection test is one method for es-
tablishing different levels of culpability .103 
Americans label drug abuse the number one problem in recent 
polls.104 This may in part reflect public response to the increased at-
tention given the issue by the Bush administration.105 Objective data 
indicate drug use declined in the past decade. 106 Standing in sharp 
contrast to President Reagan's highly promoted "zero tolerance" pro-
gram which cracked down on users, 107 police officials have argued 
these strict enforcement programs are not effective.108 In fact, follow-
101. Several legal commentators have advocated adoption of a more "dynamic" process of 
interpreting statutes. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); Aleinikoff, supra note 19; 
Eskridge, supra note 19. These models look to current needs and public opinion to determine an 
appropriate interpretation of the statute. R. DWORKIN, supra, at 341, 349; Eskridge, supra note 
19, at 1483. Statutes, at least in situations where the text and legislative history will support 
alternate readings, should be read against the current "web of beliefs" to identify an 
interpretation meeting current needs. See also Aleinikoff, supra note 19, at 49 ("[T]reat the 
statute as if it had been enacted yesterday and try to make sense of it in today's world."). 
Eskridge limits the scope of his dynamic interpretation to public regarding statutes; the drug 
enforcement statutes, however, are not passed to service narrow interest groups. Cf. Eskridge, 
supra note 19, at 1483. , 
102. See supra note 8. 
103. Parts II and III examine a second method for drawing lines between drug offenders. In 
applying eighth amendment protections, current public opinion arguably should weigh much 
less. See infra sections 11.B, 111.B (discussing the cruel and unusual punishments clause). 
104. See Kohut & Hugick, Colombians Question Worth of Drug War; Americans Skeptical It 
Can Be Won. GALLUP RPT. No. 288, Sept. 1989, at 4 (Sixty-three percent of respondents named 
drugs/drug abuse as the nation's number one problem.). 
105. See id. (In May 1989, before President Bush's drug policy address, only twenty-seven 
percent of respondents thought drugs/drug abuse the nation's number one problem.). 
106. See, e.g., Morin & Allen, supra note 4, at C4, col. 1 ("Contrary to public perceptions, 
however, drug use appears to be slowly declining. . • . Even cocaine, the hot drug of the '80s, 
showed a significant drop in overall use last year. . . . Researchers believe ... that even crack is 
losing favor and will fade significantly in the next few years."). 
107. Meese Asks Drug Tests For 'Most' Workers: Mayors Assail Federal Efforts As Poorly 
Run. Underfunded, Wash. Post, Apr. 27, 1988, at Al, col. 4 ("Attorney General Edwin Meese 
Ill, saying the nation needs 'zero tolerance of drugs in any place, any time,' called yesterday for 
virtually all workers in the country to be tested by their employers for use of illicit drugs."). 
108. See, e.g., New Tactic in Drug War Is to Aim at Casual Users, Boston Globe, Apr. 2, 
1989, at 1 (quoting Patrick Murphy, director of police policy for the National Council of Mayors 
and a former top police official); 'Zero Tolerance': Zero Effect?, The Christian Science Monitor, 
Aug. 23, 1988, at 3, col. 3 ("Seventy-three percent of state and local prosecutors queried singled 
out the Reagan administration's policy of 'zero tolerance' as having little importance as an en-
forcement tool."). 
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ing a public outcry resulting from the seizure of many pleasure boats 
after finding only small amounts of drugs, the government moved 
away from zero tolerance.109 While some polls indicate the general 
public is willing to institute drug enforcement procedures which will 
infringe civil liberties, 110 the trend has been toward more lenient en-
forcement, at least for casual users - the group most likely to be ex-
empted from forfeiture by the substantial connection test. Congress 
recently has enacted provisions which substantially decrease penalties 
for first-time offenders.111 The new law reduces the maximum fine 
from $100,000 to $10,000 and shifts enforcement to the civil arena. 112 
These changes were intentionally made by Congress; the Attorney 
General's office had not proposed the decrease in penalties.113 
In sum, while the text of section 881 may support a broad interpre-
tation, a narrower scope for civil forfeiture better matches the intent of 
the enacting Congress, the understanding of subsequent Congresses, 
and present public opinion for fighting the war on drugs. As the next 
Part demonstrates, the eighth amendment may also mandate a nar-
rower interpretation of section 881. 
II. THE EIGHTH .AMENDMENT MANDATES NARROWING THE 
SCOPE OF SECTION 881 FORFEITURE 
This Part offers two arguments for eighth amendment review of 
civil forfeitures. 114 First, the forfeiture of conveyances or real prop-
erty, especially those acquired legitimately and subject to forfeiture 
only by involvement in drug activity, should be treated as a criminal 
or quasi-criminal penalty. Despite express congressional intent to 
fashion a civil remedy, forfeiture's punitive nature mandates eighth 
amendment protection. Second, the lack of specific reference to crimi-
nal proceedings in the text of the eighth amendment strongly argues in 
favor of applying it to civil proceedings. While the Supreme Court has 
explicitly ruled out eighth amendment review of punitive damages 
awards in suits between private parties, 115 the government prosecutes 
109. U.S. Softens Policy of Seizing Boats With Drugs Aboard, Wash. Post, Feb. 21, 1989, at 
A21, col. 1. 
110. See Morin & Allen, supra note 4. 
111. 21 U.S.C.A. § 844a (West Supp. 1990); see also The Drug Bill and Decriminalization: 
Maximum Civil Penalty Will Be Far Lighter Than Under Cu"ent Law, Wash. Post, Oct. 28, 
1988, at A3, col. 1. 
112. This use of civil process is less troubling than civil forfeiture because the fines are rela-
tively small. 21 U.S.C.A. § 844a (West Supp. 1990). Further, federal guidelines require propor-
tionality review for fines. See 18 U.S.C. § 357(a) (1988); infra note 287. 
113. Wash. Post, supra note 111, atA3, col. 3 (statement of Karey Copeland, Deputy Associ-
ate Attorney General). 
114. A Note recently published in the Come// Law Review independently reached a similar 
conclusion. Note, Fear and Loathing and the Forfeiture Laws, 75 CoRNELL L. REV. 1151 
(1990). 
115. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2909 (1989). 
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civil forfeiture. The cruel and unusual punishments clause or the ex-
cessive fines clause of the eighth amendment or both ought to limit all 
section 881 forfeitures. 
A. The Penal Nature of Forfeiture Mandates Eighth Amendment 
Review 
This section advocates eighth amendment proportionality review 
of section 881 forfeitures. Civil forfeiture proceedings sufficiently pe-
nalize defendants that constitutional protections should be applied. 
Additionally, the Supreme Court's doctrine surrounding the cruel and 
unusual punishments clause and the excessive fines clause mandates 
eighth amendment review of civil forfeitures. 
The initial question is whether constitutional protections should be 
applied in a civil forfeiture proceeding at all. Courts generally con-
clude that constitutional rights do not apply civil settings.116 Govern-
ment prosecution of civil forfeitures, however, requires constitutional 
protection. In several instances, the Supreme Court has applied cer-
tain constitutional protections to forfeiture proceedings, evincing con-
cern for their quasi-criminal nature. In Boyd v. United States, 117 the 
Supreme Court applied the fifth amendment to a forfeiture proceeding, 
invalidating a statute compelling the defendant to produce documents 
of illegal importation or stand to have admitted the fact. While the 
"Court has declined ... to give full scope to the reasoning and dicta in 
Boyd ... ,"118 the proposition that forfeiture is at least quasi-crimi-
nal119 has survived. In One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 120 
the Court followed Boyd and applied the exclusionary rule to evidence 
procured by an illegal search and offered in a civil forfeiture action. 121 
The Court wrote, "[A]s ... Justice Bradley aptly pointed out in Boyd, 
a forfeiture proceeding is quasi-criminal in character."122 Similarly, in 
United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 123 the Court invali-
116. See Browning-Ferris Industries, 109 S. Ct. at 2915 ("At the time of its ratification, the 
original Constitution was criticized in the Massachusetts and Virginia Conventions for its failure 
to provide any protections for persons convicted of crimes. This criticism provided the impetus for 
the inclusion of the Eighth Amendment in the Bill of Rights.") (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 
430 U.S. 651, 666 (1977) (emphasis added)); 109 S. Ct. at 2914-16 (asserting the Bill of Rights 
applied to the criminal context); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371-73 (1970) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring) (enumerating reasons that constitutional protections are not required in "civil" cases); see 
also Darmstadter & Mackoff, supra note 44, at 39-46 (examining the limited constitutional and 
procedural protections afforded§ 881 claimants). But see infra section 11.B. 
117. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
118. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 253 (1980). 
119. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 633-34. 
120. 380 U.S. 693 (1965). 
121. 380 U.S. at 696. Plymouth Sedan involved a violation of Pennsylvania liquor tax laws. 
380 U.S. at 694. 
122. 380 U.S. at 700. 
123. 401 U.S. 715 (1971). 
184 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 89:165 
dated, on fifth amendment grounds, a statute requiring gamblers to 
register with the government.124 While not a forfeiture case, United 
States v. Halper 125 is significant in that the Supreme Court held that 
the double jeopardy clause applies to civil penalties sought on the basis 
of activity for which the defendant previously had been criminally 
punished.126 
The Supreme Court has developed a two prong test to determine 
whether constitutional protections should be applied to a given statu-
tory penalty: 
First, we have set out to determine whether Congress, in establishing the 
penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a prefer-
ence for one label or the other. Second, where Congress has indicated an 
intention to establish a civil penalty, we have inquired further whether 
the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to 
negate that intention.127 
Analyzing section 881 under the first prong of this test will demon-
strate that Congress intended the forfeiture to be a civil proceeding. 
The second prong, however, reveals that constitutional protections 
should apply. Civil forfeiture is a penal sanction and the risk of gov-
ernment police abuse justifies applying eighth amendment protections. 
Congress undeniably intended section 881 to function as civil for-
feiture. The legislative history establishes that the proceeding should 
be by way of libel in rem, a civil complaint against the property as 
wrongdoer. 128 Subsequent legislative pronouncements demonstrate 
that section 881 is considered a civil remedy.129 Still, Congress did 
recognize the penal nature of forfeiture. The avowed purpose in de-
priving drug traffickers of assets and instrumentalities demonstrates 
Congress' intent to punish or at least incapacitate.130 
The second prong of the Supreme Court's constitutional-protec-
tions test evaluates the congressional characterization of the penalty. 
In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 131 the Supreme Court elucidated 
124. 401 U.S. at 716-18 (following Boy<i). 
125. 109 s. Ct. 1892 (1989). 
126. 109 S. Ct. at 1902. 
127. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980) (citations omitted). 
128. 1970 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 26, at 56, reprinted at 4624; see also United States v. 
One 107.9 Acre Parcel of Land Located in Warren Township, Bradford County, Pa., 898 F.2d 
396, 400 (3d Cir. 1990) ("We are satisfied that the language of the subchapter shows that Con· 
gress intended § 881(a)(7) to be a civil remedy. We say this because § 88l(a)(7) appears under 
Part E, Administrative and Enforcement Provisions of the subchapter, not in Part D, Offenses 
and Penalties. Furthermore, the civil proceedings of the Custom Laws for in rem proceedings 
apply, 21 U.S.C. § 881(d) (1988).") (citation omitted); supra note 12. 
129. 1984 SENATE REPORT, supra note 97, at 193, reprinted at 3376 ("A variety of assets 
used in drug violations, such as boats, cars, and manufacturing equipment, may be civilly for· 
feited under 21 U.S.C. [§] 881."). 
130. See supra sections I.C - I.D; text accompanying note 85 ("[d]ue to the penal nature of 
forfeiture statutes"); text accompanying note 97 ("forfeiture ••• [is] a powerful deterrent"). 
131. 372 U.S. 144 (1963). 
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seven factors to consider when determining whether a purportedly 
civil statute is sufficiently punitive to demand- application of the full 
panoply of constitutional rights available in criminal proceedings: 
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, 
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it 
comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will 
promote the traditional aims of punishment - retribution and deter-
rence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, 
whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected 
is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the 
alternative purpose assigned are all relevant to the inquiry .... 132 
In general, however, courts considering whether constitutional 
protections reach section 881 proceedings have not discussed the Men-
doza-Martinez test. In United States v. Tax Lot 1500, 133 the Ninth 
Circuit, while acknowledging that criminal forfeiture and civil forfei-
ture were "functionally equivalent,"134 held that the historical devel-
opment of the proceedings differed and Congress still chose to make a 
distinction.135 This result ignores the purpose of the Mendoza-Marti-
nez test, which is to determine the substance behind the form of a 
sanction.136 In United States v. Santoro, 137 the Fourth Circuit also de-
ferred to congressional designation of section 881 as civil forfeiture. 
The court noted that congressional intent could be upset on " 'the 
clearest proof' that the effects of this statute are so punitive that the 
forfeiture cannot be treated as civil."138 The Santoro court, however, 
failed to apply the Mendoza-Martinez test to determine whether that 
"clear proof" was present. The Supreme Court, on the other hand, 
continues to apply the Mendoza-Martinez test.139 
Examining the Mendoza-Martinez factors establishes that civil for-
feiture is sufficiently penal to justify application of constitutional pro-
132. 372 U.S. at 168-69 (footnotes omitted). 
133. 861 F.2d 232 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 364 (1989). 
134. 861 F.2d at 234. 
135. 861 F.2d at 235. 
136. See Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168. 
137. 866 F.2d 1538 (4th Cir. 1989). 
138. 866 F.2d at 1543; see also United States v. One 107.9 Acre Parcel of Land Located in 
Warren Township, Bradford County, Pa., 898 F.2d 396, 401 (3d Cir. 1990) (where the court 
faced an eighth amendment challenge to a § 881 forfeiture and court's entire analysis of the 
penaVcivil distinction occupied one paragraph, and addressed none of the Mendoza-Martinez 
factors, merely citing Santoro for support). 
139. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (1989) ("This list of considerations, while 
certainly neither exhaustive nor dispositive, has proved helpful in our own consideration of simi-
lar questions ...• "). In one recent forfeiture case, the Supreme Court reviewed the enumerated 
factors to determine whether constitutional protection should be applied. United States v. One 
Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 365-66 (1984). In other areas, the Court continues to 
use the Mendoza-Martinez test to characterize penalties as either civil or criminal. See, e.g., 
United States v. Halper, 109 S. Ct. 1892, 1902 (1989). 
186 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 89:165 
tections. 140 Forfeiture clearly acts as an affirmative disability or 
liability, the first Mendoza-Martinez factor. Congress passed section 
881 as a means of attacking the large scale drug trafficker, and of de-
terring the commission of drug felonies by eliminating the traffickers' 
profits. 141 More tellingly, Congress also intended to confiscate the in-
strumentalities of drug traffickers, thereby disabling them from future 
dealings.142 Courts have recognized that forfeiture constitutes a pun-
ishment of the individual. In Boyd, the Supreme Court wrote, "We 
are also clearly of [the] opinion that proceedings instituted for the pur-
pose of declaring the forfeiture of a man's property by reason of of-
fences committed by him, though they may be civil in form, are in 
their nature criminal."143 In In re Kingsley, 144 the First Circuit noted 
that application of the forfeiture laws could result in confiscation of all 
of the defendant's property.145 The forfeiture of a person's assets cer-
tainly imposes an affirmative disability; the question must be whether 
that disability can be explained in civil terms. The forfeiture of con-
veyances under section 881(a)(4) and real property under 88l(a)(7), 
however, does not simply confiscate illegal property nor does it impose 
traditional civil damages. 
The history of civil forfeiture, the second Mendoza-Martinez fac-
tor, also reveals the punitive nature of section 881. Concepts of forfei-
ture, and the fiction of the property as wrongdoer, date from Old 
Testament times. 146 While initially a device to limit liability,147 forfei-
ture of estate became a common penalty imposed by the English 
crown on felons. 148 As the Court in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht 
Leasing Inc. 149 noted, however, forfeiture of the offending property as 
deodand did not become part of American law.150 After acknowledg-
ing the series of cases which followed the tradition of the property as 
140. Cf. Darmstadter & Mackoff, supra note 44, at 49-50 (briefly considering Mendoza-Mar-
tinez and section 881). 
141. See supra section I.C. 
142. See supra section I.D. 
143. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633-34 (1886). 
144. 802 F.2d 571 (1st Cir. 1986). 
145. 802 F.2d at 578; United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1508-09 (10th Cir. 1988) 
(noting the potential for police abuse in seizing defendant's assets); United States v. $39,000 in 
Canadian Currency, 801 F.2d 1210, 1219 & n.7 (10th Cir. 1986) (same). 
146. "If an ox gore a man or a woman, that they die: then the ox shall be surely stoned and 
his flesh shall not be eaten; but the owner of the ox shall be quit.'' Exodus 21:28. 
147. o.w. HOLMES, THE CoMMON LAW 7-16 (1923) (giving up the offending property insu-
lated its owner from liability). 
148. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES **259-62; see also Calero-Toledo v. Pearson 
Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682 (1974), ("Forfeiture also resulted at common law from 
conviction for felonies and treason. The convicted felon forfeited his chattels to the Crown and 
his lands escheated to his lord; the convicted traitor forfeited all of his property, real and per-
sonal, to the Crown.''). 
149. 416 U.S. 663 (1974). 
150. 416 U.S. at 682-83. A deodand is property which has offended the king, usually by 
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wrongdoer, 151 the Court upheld a Puerto Rico drug forfeiture statute 
on the ground it supported the criminal laws. 
Plainly, the Puerto Rican forfeiture statutes further the punitive and 
deterrent purposes that have been found sufficient to uphold, against 
constitutional challenge, the application of other forfeiture statutes to 
the property of innocents. Forfeiture of conveyances that have been 
used - and may be used again - in violation of the narcotics laws 
fosters the purposes served by the underlying criminal statutes, both by 
preventing further illicit use of the conveyance and by imposing an eco-
nomic penalty, thereby rendering illegal behavior unprofitable.152 
Despite congressional intent to develop a separate line of civil forfei-
ture statutes, distinct from criminal forfeiture, the substance of the 
history shows they are, in fact, the same.153 
The third Mendoza-Martinez factor, the finding of scienter, shows 
section 881 forfeiture as penal. This test factors out statutorily im-
posed penalties for negligence in the tort context. While the claimant 
need not be found guilty in a criminal trial for the property to be for-
feit, 154 section 881 focuses on property used or "intended to be used" 
to facilitate drug crimes.155 Several courts have held that involvement 
in drug trafficking is secondary; "intent is the determining factor 
•••• "
156 The statute creates an exception for innocent owners.157 The 
Court in Calero-Toledo noted that forfeiture of innocent owners' prop-
erty might give rise to constitutional problems. 
[I]t would be difficult to reject the constitutional claim of an owner 
whose property subjected to forfeiture had been taken from him without 
causing a death, and is therefore forfeit. Traditionally, the king was to dedicate the property to 
charity. 
151. 416 U.S. at 683-86; see also Note, supra note 17, at 172-75 (tracing the history of civil 
forfeiture); Darmstadter & Mackoff, supra note 44, at 28-29 (same). 
152. 416 U.S. at 686-87 (footnote omitted). In the omitted footnote, the Court recognized 
that the Puerto Rican statute at issue was substantially the same as section 88l(a). 416 U.S. at 
686 n.25. 
153. This conclusion may be bolstered in three ways: (1) history should not be the touch-
stone and is, in fact, only one part of the Mendoza-Martinez analysis; (2) as section 11.B will 
argue, the eighth amendment was intended by the framers to apply to civil realm; (3) the conclu-
sion of the Calero-Toledo court demonstrates that civil forfeiture serves the traditional aims of 
criminal law - punishment and deterrence. 
154. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 683. 
155. 21 U.S.C. § 88l(a)(4), (6), (7) (1988); see supra note 8. 
156. United States v. One 1980 Cadillac Eldorado, 705 F.2d 862, 863 (6th Cir. 1983) (per 
curiam); see also United States v. One 1980 Bertram 58' Motor Yacht, 876 F.2d 884, 887-88 
(11th Cir. 1989) ("It is the state of mind of the criminal with respect to the property sought to be 
forfeited which is determinative, not whether the property is actually used to execute the crimi-
nal intentions .••. ") (citing United States v. 124 East North Avenue, Lake Forest, Ill., 651 F. 
Supp. 1350 (N.D. Ill. 1987)). 
157. 21 U.S.C. § 88l(a)(4)(b), (a)(7) (1988). Property will not be forfeit where used without 
the owner's permission or with permission but without consent to use in a drug transaction, 
provided the innocent owner has taken reasonable steps to prevent such use. 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 88l(a)(4)(C), 88l(a)(7) (1988). See Goldsmith & Linderman, supra note 17 (arguing that 
innocent owners need added protections); Note, supra note 17 (same as to innocent transferees). 
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his privity or consent. Similarly, the same might be said of an owner 
who proved not only that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the 
wrongful activity, but also that he had done all that reasonably could be 
expected to prevent the proscribed use of his property; for, in that cir-
cumstance, it would be difficult to conclude that forfeiture served legiti-
mate purposes and was not unduly oppressive.158 
Further, while the forfeiture action is not predicated on violation of 
criminal statutes, the subsections triggering forfeiture, 881(a)(l)-(2), 
mirror criminal drug activity.159 
Applying the fourth Mendoza-Martinez factor, whether the pen-
alty operates as punishment or deterrence, reveals that section 881 
goes beyond other civil statutes. Whereas general civil remedies are 
directly proportional to the harm caused by the activity, civil forfei-
ture clearly serves to punish. "[A] civil sanction that cannot fairly be 
said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can be explained 
only as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punish-
ment .... "160 In United States v. Ward, 161 the Supreme Court distin-
guished the holding of Boyd v. United States, 162 on the basis that the 
penalty imposed in Ward was "much more analogous to traditional 
civil damages."163 In Ward, the statute imposed a fine on companies 
spilling oil in navigable waterways. The amount of the fine depended, 
in large part, on the actual cost of cleanup.164 A civil penalty also 
qualifies as purely remedial if the government simply seizes contra-
band.165 The claimant cannot assert any property right in illegal 
goods. The Supreme Court has applied this distinction to a statute 
forfeiting automobiles used to further violation of state liquor tax laws. 
"There is nothing even remotely criminal in possessing an automobile. 
It is only the alleged use to which this particular automobile was put 
that subjects [its owner to possible forfeiture]." 166 Section 881 does 
not provide that forfeiture in an individual case will be ordered only 
where necessary to compensate the government. In practice, the ap-
plication of section 881 operates to forfeit property based on its facili-
tation of or participation in drug crimes, not its relation to harm 
caused.167 Congress added the real property forfeiture provision to 
158. 416 U.S. at 689-90 (citations and footnote omitted). 
159. See infra note 170. 
160. United States v. Halper, 109 S. Ct. 1892, 1902 (1989). 
161. 448 U.S. 242 (1980). 
162. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
163. Ward, 448 U.S. at 254. 
164. 448 U.S. at 256-57 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). 
165. See United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 364 (1984). 
166. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 699 (1965). 
167. While it might be contended that any property that facilitates drug crimes in any way 
causes immeasurable harm, the eighth amendment proportionality principle seems to demand 
determining precise costs. See infra notes 256-64 and accompanying text. Further, the premise 
of infinitely great harm seems implausible. 
October 1990] Note-Na"owing Civil Drug Forfeiture 189 
section 881 to further the "deterrent" power of the law.168 In fact, 
even the Justice Department acknowledges that the "purpose of civil 
forfeiture is ... to deter and punish criminal activity. "169 
The scope of property subject to forfeiture under section 88l{a)(4) 
is determined by sections 88l{a)(l), 88l(a)(2), and 88l{a)(9)170 which 
refer to the criminal drug statutes enacted as the "Controlled Sub-
stances Act."171 This interconnection shows that the fifth Mendoza-
Martinez factor, the criminal nature of the behavior, points toward 
applying constitutional protections. Under section 88l{a)(7), real 
property may be forfeit only if it facilitates the commission of a drug 
crime punishable by more than one year's imprisonment.172 The main 
thrust of the civil forfeiture statutes is to attack or punish criminal 
behavior, not merely to act as a civil penalty for tortious conduct. In 
addition, section 881 incorporates administrative procedures for re-
mission and mitigation.173 The inclusion of these provisions indicates 
that only those suspected of criminal behavior will be prosecuted in a 
civil forfeiture action.114 
168. See supra note 97 and accompanying text ("[T]he forfeiture of property would ... be[] a 
powerful deterrent."). 
169. 11 THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MANuAL B-25 (Prentice-Hall Law & Business Supp. 
1988-2). "Therefore, even if the property is worth little, its forfeiture may nonetheless serve 
legitimate and overriding law enforcement objectives by depriving the wrongdoer of its use and 
availability." Id. 
170. These sections provide: • 
(a) The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property right 
shall exist in them: 
(1) All controlled substances which have been manufactured, distributed, dispensed, or 
acquired in violation of this subchapter. 
(2) All raw materials, products, and equipment of any kind which are used, or intended 
for use, in manufacturing, compounding, processing, delivering, importing, or exporting any 
controlled substance in violation of this subchapter. 
(9) All listed chemicals, all drug manufacturing equipment, all tableting machines, all 
encapsulating machines, and all gelatin capsules, which have been imported, exported, man-
ufactured, possessed, distributed, or intended to be distributed, imported, or exported, in 
violation of a felony provision of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter. 
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(l)-(2), (9) (1988). 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) (1988) provides for forfeiture, in 
most instances, of all conveyances used to facilitate transportation, etc., of the substances, mater-
ials, products, and equipment defined in sections (a)(l)-(2) and (9). 
171. Title II of Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (1970). 
172. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988); see supra note 8. 
173. 21 U.S.C. § 881(d) (1988); 19 U.S.C. § 1618 (1988); 28 C.F.R § 9 (1989). 
174. The regulation provides that the Attorney General will mitigate forfeiture or remit the 
property when a claimant can prove she had no knowledge of the illegal use of the property. 28 
C.F.R § 9.5 (1989). Cf. United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 721-22 
(1971). 
[T]he broad language of § 7302 [the civil forfeiture statute at issue] cannot be understood 
without considering the terms of the other statutes which regulate forfeiture proceedings. 
An express statutory provision permits the innocent owner to prove to the Secretary of the 
Treasury [that remission is justified] . . . . Upon this showing, the Secretary is authorized to 
return the seized property . . . . It is not to be presumed that the Secretary will not conscien-
tiously fulfill this trust, and the courts have intervened when the innocent petitioner's pro-
tests have gone unheeded. When the forfeiture statutes are viewed in their entirety, it is 
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The sixth Mendoza-Martinez factor seeks a rational alternative 
purpose for the penalty. While section 881 might be construed as a 
remedial compensation for the government's costs of preventing drug 
trafficking, this alternative purpose alone does not show section 881 to 
be nonpunitive. All criminal activity imposes social costs. A civil 
remedy exists only when the costs of the single act can be associated 
with a specific harm.175 Section 881 does permit the proceeds of the 
forfeiture to fund further drug enforcement efforts.176 This purpose, 
however, should be considered secondary. The costs of past and fu-
ture drug enforcement cannot be traced to the particular activity giv-
ing rise to forfeiture. Additionally, the fines imposed in any criminal 
case could serve as repayment for enforcement expenses.177 Absent 
the involvement of the property in criminal activity, the government's 
need for revenue would never justify forfeiture.178 
The final Mendoza-Martinez factor, whether the penalty is exces-
sive compared with any alternate purpose, militates in favor of apply-
ing constitutional protections to civil forfeiture. Section 881 does not 
require a determination that the value of the property sought to be 
forfeit is related to the harm caused or the cost of enforcement. 
Rather, the only determination required is whether the property some-
how facilitated a drug crime. The potential for prosecutorial abuse is 
obvious.179 In fact, since the enactment of provisions allowing prose-
cuting agencies to retain the forfeit property or its proceeds, the total 
dollar amount of forfeiture has jwnped dramatically.180 While some 
increase may be due to heightened emphasis on drug crimes, the size 
of the jump strongly suggests an alternate motive, pecuniary gain for 
their departments, on the part of the police.181 
manifest that they are intended to impose a penalty only upon those who are significantly 
involved in a criminal enterprise. 
401 U.S. at 721-22 (citations and footnote omitted). 
175. See United States v. Halper, 109 S. Ct. 1892, 1902 (1989) (quoted supra in text accom· 
panying note 157); United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 256-57 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring 
in the judgment); 4 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & o. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS§ 25.1 (2d ed. 1986) 
(discussing the principle of compensation). 
176. 21 U.S.C. § 881(e) (1988). 
177. Even if the rationale of repaying government enforcement expenses is accepted, faithful 
execution of that principle would require some government showing of cost and an appropriate 
judicial finding. Such a showing, which now does not occur, would be one important piece of 
evidence in the proportionality review proposed infra Part III. 
178. In several cases where the forfeiture statute was explicitly enacted to protect the revenue 
laws, the Supreme Court has either used strict review of the scope of forfeiture or explicitly 
applied constitutional protections. See, e.g., One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 
U.S. 693 (1963) (exclusionary rule applies to evidence offered in a forfeiture proceeding); Boyd v. 
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (applying the fifth amendment to a customs enforcement and 
forfeiture statute); supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text. 
179. See supra notes 13, 145. 
180. Drug Case Booty Enriches Agencies, supra note 5. 
181. Id. ("[T]he booty of the drug war, acquired through laws that were intended to punish 
criminals by seizing their property but are now being viewed by law-enforcement groups as a way 
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Each of the seven Martinez-Mendoza factors indicates section 881's 
civil forfeiture provisions should be considered punitive and actions 
thereunder should be conducted with constitutional safeguards. The 
"clearest proof" sought by the Santoro court182 seems to be present. 
Civil forfeiture ought to be considered a quasi-criminal proceeding and 
traditional constitutional protections ought to be applied. 
B. The Eighth Amendment Should Apply to All Government 
Extracted Fines 
Alternatively, eighth amendment protections should apply without 
regard to whether the proceeding is criminal/penal or civil. The 
Court's eighth amendment cases demonstrate concern for propor-
tional punishment and protection against abuse of police powers. Sec-
tion 881 forfeiture of property gives rise to these concerns, mandating 
explicit eighth amendment review. 
Most of the Supreme Court's eighth amendment doctrine centers 
on the cruel and unusual punishments clause. This clause requires 
that all punishments be proportional to the behavior being punished. 
Section 881 runs afoul of the cruel and unusual punishment clause by 
utilizing forfeiture in all cases, regardless of the degree of involvement 
of the property or the seriousness of the crime. 
The Supreme Court's eighth amendment proportionality doctrine 
focuses on the nature of both the crime and the punishment. In Rum-
mel v. Estelle, 183 a case seen as an attempt to limit the applicability of 
eighth amendment cruel and unusual punishment analysis to death 
penalty cases, 184 the Court suggested that the triviality of the crime 
was a relevant factor. Rummel received a mandatory life sentence af-
ter obtaining $120.75 under false pretenses.185 Rummel was convicted 
and sentenced under Texas' recidivist statutes.186 The Court, in af-
firming Rummel's sentence, noted the "unique nature" of capital pun-
to increase their own arsenals," is vigorously sought by police agencies.); id. (" 'The aim used 
tobe [sic] to hurt the bad guy' said Lisa Griffis, who manages seized and forfeited property for the 
United States Marshall Service in the southern district of Texas. 'Now we want to hurt the bad 
guy and maximize profit for the government.' "); id. ("The increased seizure activity nationwide 
is credited mostly to the provisions of the new law that allows asset sharing[,]" with local law 
enforcement agencies who may receive a portion of the proceeds from seized and sold property.). 
182. United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538, 1543-44 (4th Cir. 1989). See supra notes 127, 
139 and accompanying text. 
183. 445 U.S. 263 (1980). 
184. See Rummel, 445 U.S. at 288 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("The Court concedes today that 
the principle of disproportionality plays a role in the review of sentences imposing the death 
penalty, but suggests that the principle may be less applicable when a noncapital sentence is 
challenged."); Dressler, Substantive Criminal Law Through the Looking Glass of Rummel v. Es-
telle: Proportlonality and Justi'ce as Endangered Doctrines, 34 Sw. L.J. 1063, 1065 (1981); Gard-
ner, The Determinate Sentencing Movement and the Eighth Amendment: Excessive Punishment 
Before and After Rummel v. Estelle, 1980 DUKE L.J. 1103, 1112. 
185. 445 U.S. at 266. 
186. 445 U.S. at 266-67. Rummel's prior offenses were "fraudulent use of a credit card to 
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ishment and wrote, "Outside the context of capital punishment, 
successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences 
have been exceedingly rare."187 In rationalizing its prior decision of 
Weems v. United States, 188 where the Court had invalidated a sentence 
of cadena temporal 189 the Court relied to some extent on the "trivial 
nature" of Weems' offense. 190 Additionally, the Court noted that pro-
portionality review would be appropriate in the noncapital context 
where the offense was truly trivial. "This is not to say that a propor-
tionality principle would not come into play in the extreme example 
mentioned by the dissent, if a legislature made overtime parking a fel-
ony punishable by life imprisonment."191 
In Rummel the Supreme Court was also concerned with the na-
ture of the punishment. Rummel pointed at the death penalty as a 
unique type of punishment, 192 and, in its discussion of Weems, also 
typed cadena temporal as especially egregious punishment.193 The 
Rummel majority reasonably may be read as being most concerned 
with appellate courts, especially federal courts reviewing state courts 
in habeas cases, becoming involved in reviewing the "duration" of 
sentences established by legislatures.194 In Hutto v. Davis, 19s a per 
curiam described Rummel as drawing a distinction between considera-
tion of the time length of a sentence and the nature of the punishment. 
Like the respondent in this case, Rummel argued that the length of his 
imprisonment was so "grossly disproportionate" to the crime for which 
he was sentenced that it violated the ban on cruel and unusual punish-
ment of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. In rejecting that argu-
ment, we distinguished between punishments - such as the death 
penalty - which by their very nature differ from all other forms of con-
ventionally accepted punishment, and punishments which differ from 
others only in duration. 196 
Civil forfeiture qualifies as a punishment for purposes of the cruel 
and unusual punishments clause. First, as demonstrated in section 
obtain $80 worth of goods or services .•.. [and] passing a forged check in the amount of 
$28.36 .•.. " 445 U.S. at 256. 
187. 445 U.S. at 272. 
188. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). 
189. A minimum sentence of 12 years and one day, which included harsh physical labor 
while in chains. 217 U.S. at 364. 
190. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 273 (Weems had falsified a public record.). 
191. 445 U.S. at 274 n.11. 
192. 445 U.S. at 272 ("This theme, the unique nature of the death penalty for purposes of 
Eighth Amendment analysis, has been repeated time and time again in our opinions."). 
193. 445 U.S. at 275 ("Similarly, in Weems the Court could differentiate in an objective 
fashion between the highly unusual cadena temporal and more traditional forms of imprisonment 
imposed under the Anglo-Saxon system."); see also supra note 189. 
194. See Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274-76. 
195. 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (per curiam). 
196. 454 U.S. at 372-73. 
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II.A, forfeiture acts as punishment for and deterrence to engaging in 
criminal activities. 197 Second, from the perspective of eighth amend-
ment policy, concerns over proportionality of punishment and abuse 
of police power mandate typing civil forfeiture a punishment.198 
Third, the fiction that the property is actually the wrongdoer no longer 
should be maintained. Property cannot alone take any action. Forfei-
ture deprives a person of property, often legitimately acquired prop-
erty. When combined with the potential for prosecutorial abuse, the 
constitutional value of proportionality ought to overcome the 
fiction. 199 
The Court's recent decision in Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco 
Disposal, Inc. 200 provides additional justification for applying eighth 
amendment protections to civil forfeitures. In Browning-Ferris Indus-
tries, the Supreme Court considered whether the eighth amendment 
limits punitive damages in civil suits between private parties. The ra-
tionale the court provided for denying eighth amendment scrutiny in 
the case of punitive damages suggests the amendment should apply to 
civil forfeiture.201 
The eighth amendment's history demonstrates that i~ should be ap-
plied whenever the coercive power of the state is brought to bear. In 
Browning-Ferris Industries, the majority reviewed the history of the 
eighth amendment. The amercements clause of Magna Charta,202 in 
language substantially similar to the eighth amendment, was ad-
dressed to the problem of wrongdoers being put at the "Mercy of the 
.King" when "it was within the King's power to require [the wrong-
doer's estate] forfeit."203 The amercements clause was reproduced in 
the English Bill of Rights of 1689.204 The same language appeared in 
197. See supra notes 141-53 and accompanying text. 
198. See supra notes 183-96 and accompanying text. 
199. Such a notion of rights in rem is ••. crude and fallacious; and it can but serve as a 
stumbling-block to clear thinking and exact expression. A man may indeed sustain close 
and beneficial physical relations to a given physical thing: he may physically control and use 
such thing, and he may physically exclude others from any similar control or enjoyment. 
But, obviously, such purely physical relations could as well exist quite apart from, or occa-
sionally in spite of, the law of organized society: physical relations are wholly distinct from 
jural relations. The latter take significance from the law; and, since the purpose of the law is 
to regulate the conduct of human beings, all jural relations must, in order to be clear and 
direct in their meaning, be predicated of such human beings. 
Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 
721 (1917) (footnotes omitted). 
200. 109 s. Ct. 2909 (1989). 
201. The Court explicitly refused to hold that the excessive fines clause would be limited to 
criminal cases. 109 S. Ct. at 2914. 
202. Magna Charta, ch. 20. 
203. 109 S. Ct. at 2918 n.15 (citations omitted); see also Massey, The Excessive Fines Clause 
and Punitive Damages: Some Lessons From History, 40 V AND. L. REv. 1233, 1251 n.107 (1987) 
("Bracton provides a voluminous listing of conduct meriting amercement that may be catego-
rized as follows: ••• crimes, •.. civil misconduct, ... and sanctions in civil litigation .... "). 
204. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES **378-79. ("For the Bill of Rights has partic-
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the Virginia Declaration of Rights in 1776, and eventually the Bill of 
Rights.205 In Browning-Ferris Industries, Justice O'Connor, concur-
ring in part, dissenting in part, noted that the framers' debates over the 
eighth amendment arguably point toward its application in civil as 
well as criminal contexts. "After deciding to confine the benefits of 
the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment to criminal 
proceedings, the Framers turned their attention to th~ Eighth Amend-
ment. There were no proposals to limit that Amendment to criminal 
proceedings .... "206 
While implicitly rejecting the full force of the historical analysis 
above,207 the Court's opinion in Browning-Ferris Industries does pro-
vide support for applying the excessive fines clause to civil proceedings 
in which the government prosecutes the action, including section 881 
forfeitures. First, the Court interpreted fines broadly enough to in-
clude forfeitures. 
In the absence of direct evidence of Congress' intended meaning, we 
think it significant that at the time of the drafting and ratification of the 
Amendment, the word "fine" was understood to mean a payment to a 
sovereign as punishment for some offense. Then, as now, fines were as-
sessed in criminal, rather than in private civil, actions.2os 
ularly declared that excessive fines ought not to be imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted •.• ; and the same statute further declares, that all grants and promises of fines and 
forfeitures of particular persons, before conviction, are illegal and void."); Massey, supra note 
203, at 1255-56 ("Since ancient prohibitions against excessive amercements - the precursor to 
seventeenth-century fines - applied to both civil and criminal proceedings, and since similar 
prohibitions against excessive fines were ingrained in the case law, it was important for accu-
racy's sake that article ten [of the English Bill of Rights] not be limited to criminal cases.") 
(footnote omitted); id. at 1256 ("The Declaration of Rights' excessive fines clause thus should be 
read as simultaneously prohibiting excessive fines and amercements, whether imposed by judge 
or jury, in both civil and criminal proceedings.''). Professor Massey notes that forfeiture was one 
of the abuses the English Bill of Rights was intended to address. Id. at 1244 n.62. 
205. See Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 
57 CALIF. L. REv. 839, 842 (1962) (suggesting that by the time the eighth amendment was 
inserted into the Bill of Rights, the language had become constitutional "boilerplate"); Massey, 
supra note 203, at 1241-42 (same). 
206. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2909, 2930 (1989) 
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Massey, supra note 203, at 1241 
(noting the same history, but warning that "[f]ar too much meaning can be read into the congres-
sional silence; a more likely, and mundane, reading is that Congress uncritically accepted the 
language, treating it as a shorthand expression for ancient rights rooted in the soil of English 
law"). Compare United States v. One 107.9 Acre Parcel of Land Located in Warren Township, 
Bradford County, Pa., 898 F.2d 396, 400 (3d Cir. 1990), where the court assumed that eighth 
amendment protections would only apply to criminal statutes, and predicated the application of 
that amendment on passing the two-part inquiry demanded in Ward (see supra note 127 and 
accompanying text): 
"When a statute is challenged under the eighth amendment on the ground that it is criminal 
rather than civil, a court will engage in a two-level inquiry. First, it will determine the 
congressional purpose. Second, if the statute is civil, the court will decide whether the statu· 
tory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate a civil objective." 
The court failed to undertake the inquiry, however. See supra note 138. 
207. See supra notes 202-06 and accompanying text (The history of the eighth amendment 
demonstrates that it should be applied in both civil and criminal contexts.). 
208. 109 S. Ct at 2915 (footnote omitted). 
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Of course, the Court here distinguishes between criminal and civil ac-
tions. This would seem to make applicability of the excessive fines 
clause to civil forfeiture contingent upon passing the Mendoza-Marti-
nez test.209 This objection is premature. In a footnote in Browning-
Ferris Industries, the Court noted that "fines" could include "money, 
recovered in a civil suit, which was paid to government."210 In fact, 
the Supreme Court explicitly distinguished a private civil suit on the 
grounds that, between two private parties, no concern of abuse of gov-
ernment power arose. "Simply put, the primary focus of the Eighth 
Amendment was the potential for governmental abuse of its 
'prosecutorial' power, not concern with the extent or purposes of civil 
damages."211 The Court continued, "These concerns are clearly inap-
posite in a case where a private party receives exemplary damages 
from another party, and the government has no share in the recov-
ery."212 The Court cited for comparison United States v. Halper,213 
which applied the double jeopardy clause to government imposition of 
civil fines. In Halper, the government's police power was implicated in 
a manner analogous to forfeiture. 
Second, in a civil forfeiture proceeding, the potential for govern-
ment abuse is unambiguous. · The government is entitled to seize the 
suspect property before the proceeding.214 The government brings the 
action against the property and the claimant, need only prove probable 
cause, and may do so by the introduction of circumstantial or hearsay 
evidence.215 By a combination of the section 881 provisions, all of a 
person's property and assets can be confiscated; in such a situation, 
judicial review of the remedy should be strict, not perfunctory.216 
Through either of two avenues, section 881 forfeiture should be 
subject to eighth amendment review. A forfeiture proceeding does not 
focus on the traditional elements of a civil claim for damages; rather 
section 881 acts to punish and deter persons involved in drug traffick-
209. See supra section II.A. 
210. 109 S. Ct. at 2915 n.7. 
211. 109 S. Ct. at 2915. 
212. 109 S. Ct. at 2918. 
213. 109 s. Ct. 1892 (1989). 
214. 21 u.s.c. § 881(b) (1988). 
215. 21 U.S.C. § 88l(b) (1988); see also United States v. One 1980 Bertram 58 Foot Motor 
Yacht, 876 F.2d 884, 887 (11th Cir. 1989) (asserting "well settled" principle that hearsay and 
circumstantial evidence are admissible to prove probable cause). 
216. See cases cited supra note 13 (potential for abuse). In Browning-Ferris Industries, the 
Court noted that a jury in civil cases can check any excessive statutory remedy. 109 S. Ct. at 
2919. While "a claimant who has had property seized pursuant to section 881 is entitled to a 
jury trial on the issue of whether the property was connected with drugs~]" Darmstadter & 
Mackolf, supra note 116, at 40 (citing United States v. One 1976 Mercedes Benz, 618 F.2d 453 
(7th Cir. 1980)), "as a practical matter, most section 881 matters are settled on a .•. summary 
judgment motion ..•. " Id. at 41. 
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ing. Alternatively, eighth amendment protections should apply to all 
government imposed fines and penalties. 
III. Two APPROACHES TO NARROWING THE SCOPE OF 
FORFEITURE 
This Part applies the substantial connection test and eighth amend-
ment proportionality review as two methods for narrowing the scope 
of section 881 forfeiture.217 The first section examines and attempts to 
harmonize the cases decided under the substantial connection test. 
The substantial connection cases generally deny forfeiture when the 
property has only facilitated the underlying criminal activity in a re-
moved, incidental manner. This note suggests reformulating the sub-
stantial connection test into a second degree facilitation test. Next, 
this Part identifies the seeds of eighth amendment review in the sub-
stantial connection cases, and argues that the second degree facilita-
tion test for rationalizing the substantial connection cases meets eighth 
amendment standards. This Part contends that the substantial con-
nection test does not go far enough; eighth amendment proportionality 
review ought to be a factor in all forfeitures under section 881. Fi-
nally, this Part suggests that applying the substantial connection test, 
eighth amendment review, or both, need not impede the war on large-
scale drug trafficking. 
A. Harmonizing the Substantial Connection Cases 
Many courts applying section 881 have employed the substantial 
connection or nexus analysis. In general, these courts have upheld 
forfeiture even under the stricter standard of review. The connection 
between the conveyance of real property and the underlying criminal 
activity in any particular case will fall along a spectrum.218 This sec-
tion attempts to formulate a workable standard for determining in-
stances where forfeiture should not be allowed. To that end, this 
section analyzes five cases in which the courts refused to order forfei-
ture and which fall along the hypothetical connectedness spectrum. 
This section concludes that a test for second degree facilitation identi-
fies cases where forfeiture should not be ordered. 
217. While the two paths have been developed somewhat independently in this Note, some 
connections are obvious. For example, the general eighth amendment arguments, especially in 
light of the rules of construction discussed in section I.B, support the substantial connection test 
(or another narrow construction of § 881). Additionally, the substantial connection test indi-
cates that some courts find forfeiture to be a disproportionate penalty in certain cases; this gen-
eral perception should be extended to include general eighth amendment review in all forfeiture 
cases. 
218. Even the Justice Department admits that some property will not be forfeitable under 
any standard of review. See 11 THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MANUAL B-25 (Prentice Hall 
Law & Business Supp. 1988-2) ("Whatever judicial standard is applied, it is clear that the more 
remote the connection between the conveyance and the illegal activity, the less likely it is that the 
property is subject to forfeiture."). · 
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The first two cases denying forfeiture can be disposed of on 
grounds which need not rely on the substantial connection test. In 
these cases, the government simply failed to prove any connection. In 
United States v. One 1981 Cadillac Eldorado, 219 the Drug Enforce-
ment Agency (DEA) had been investigating the claimant's husband 
and daughter for alleged involvement in heroin trafficking. The DEA 
agents one evening followed the reputed traffickers and attempted to 
pull them over. The suspects sped away in their automobile and were 
apprehended only after a high speed chase. The car and the suspects 
were searched but the DEA agents found no drugs and the suspects 
were released. The next day the DEA agent found two packets of 
heroin in his official car, in which the suspects had been transported to 
the police station. The government attempted to prove by circumstan-
tial evidence that the heroin packets could have come only from the 
suspects and, therefore, the defendant automobile must have been used 
in the transportation of drugs. 220 
The court found that the inferences urged by the government were 
insufficient to sustain forfeiture.221 Despite the court's language, this 
decision was not based on a true substantial connection analysis. The 
substantial connection test admits the connection of the property with 
a crime, but denies forfeiture on the basis that the connection is too 
attenuated. Here, the court refused to find that any crime had been 
established. 
In United States v. One 55 Foot Fishing Vessel ... Known as "The 
Sole, " 222 a court also used the rhetoric of substantial connection, but 
the decision actually denied any connection. In this case, an inform-
ant contacted a DEA agent and stated he had unloaded marijuana 
bales from a mother ship to a fishing vessel. After extensive searching 
by the DEA, the informant identified the defendant vessel through a 
photograph. The trial court, in its decision on the merits, noted that it 
had issued a warrant of seizure based on this information. "More than 
mere suspicion was involved that there was a nexus between this prop-
erty and the crime. The information supplied by the informant was 
adequate and sufficiently reliable . . . . "223 After trial on the merits, 
219. 535 F. Supp. 65 (N.D. Ill. 1982). 
220. The evidence consisted of testimony by the DEA agent to whom the official car was 
assigned that no one but himself, his partner, and the two suspects had been in the car for the 
prior two days. 535 F. Supp. at 67. 
221. 535 F. Supp. at 68. The court wrote: 
The connection that the government has been able to show in the case at bar, while not 
wholly unreasonable, is not sufficient to pass the threshold of probable cause that the vehicle 
in question was involved in the transport of narcotics as a matter oflaw. For this Court to 
permit forfeiture of claimant's vehicle under these tenuous fact circumstances would sanc-
tion a precedent - subject to potential abuse - for the disposition of other forfeiture cases. 
535 F. Supp. at 68. 
222. 656 F. Supp. 967 (D. Mass. 1987). 
223. 656 F. Supp. at 969. 
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however, the court found that the fishing vessel in question was more 
likely a similar vessel owned by the claimant's brother.224 Hence, this 
forfeiture denial was also based on the grounds no connection existed. 
The second group of cases truly followed the substantial connec-
tion test. These cases refused forfeiture when the involvement of the 
conveyance was, in some way, removed from the criminal activity. In 
United States v. One 1972 Chevrolet Corvette, 225 the claimant drove the 
defendant automobile to Logan Airport to deliver the front money for 
an LSD purchase. The claimant was arrested at the airport and the 
automobile was seized. The First Circuit reversed the lower court's 
forfeiture order, reasoning that section 881 provided per se forfeiture 
only for the transportation of drugs. The First Circuit simply did not 
believe Congress intended a tenuous connection such as the one in this 
case to support forfeiture.226 The court viewed facilitation as signifi-
cantly different from the "used in" language of the statute. "Although 
we agree that DeLorenzo's promise to reimburse Simard may have 
been essential to the occurrence of the transaction, once the sale had 
been consummated, Simard's actual reimbursement was not necessary 
to 'facilitate' that transaction. "227 The court seems to be suggesting 
that only those uses which make easier the actual consummation of 
the illegal activity will support forfeiture. Under this standard, a car 
used as a place to conduct a sale out of plain view would be forfeitable, 
while a car which solely transports the seller away from the scene of 
the sale 228 would not. 
This interpretation of One 1972 Chevrolet Corvette, that facilitation 
must involve an "antecedent relationship" to the criminal transaction, 
is inadequate. While the automobile may not have facilitated the sale 
of the drugs, the automobile did facilitate both the transportation and 
possession of the drugs after the sale; facilitation of transportation or 
possession are bases for forfeiture under section 881.229 The "antece-
dent relationship" test also would disallow the forfeiture of vehicles 
whose use constitutes a but-for cause of the crime. The court admitted 
that the claimant's commitment to provide financing was essential to 
the deal. It is possible, however, to view the court's decision as draw-
ing a line at two-step relationships to the drug crime. The court obvi-
ously would agree that financing facilitates a drug transaction. 
Similarly, a car actually moving the drugs would facilitate a crime and 
would be forfeit.230 A car used as transportation by the financier, 
224. The brother admitted as much in testimony before the court. 656 F. Supp. at 970. 
225. 625 F.2d 1026 (1st Cir. 1980). 
226. Cf. infra note 241 and accompanying text. 
227. 625 F.2d at 1030 (emphasis added). 
228. If the seller does not have drugs or proceeds on her person at the time. 
229. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) (1988); see supra note 8. 
230. 625 F.2d at 1024-25. 
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however, merely facilitates the financing of the crime or, in other 
words, "facilitates the facilitation." The First Circuit could logically 
claim that this second degree facilitation did not fall within the scope 
of the statute, notwithstanding the "in any manner" language. 
The second true substantial connection case, United States v. One 
1976 Ford F-150 Pick-up, 231 can be read consistently with the second 
degree facilitation test. In this case, the claimant was observed driving 
the defendant truck near marijuana fields. The claimant parked 
nearby and unloaded roofing supplies for a small shed near the fields. 
The claimant then surveyed the marijuana crop. The Eighth Circuit 
reversed the lower court's forfeiture order on the grounds that no evi-
dence demonstrated that the truck had facilitated growing the crop. 
While this use of the truck may be said to have facilitated the repair of 
the shed, we do not believe this fact suffices to show that the truck facili-
tated the possession of the marijuana. It is unclear as to how the shed 
helped or otherwise made easier the possession of the crop. In fact, there 
was testimony that the shed was too small to be of any use in processing 
the crop or in shielding the drugs from detection once harvested. 
Finally, there was no evidence presented that the truck was used to 
transport seed, fertilizer, agricultural tools or other equipment, items 
which could be said to have facilitated the cultivation of the illegal 
crop.232 
While the tending of a marijuana crop would definitely constitute fa-
cilitation, the conveyance here was several steps removed from that 
involvement. In the absence of more direct evidence, a visit to tend 
the shed that may have been used in growing the marijuana was sec-
ond degree facilitation. 233 
The second degree facilitation test does not, however, fit all present 
cases denying forfeiture. For example, in United States v. Certain Lots 
In City of Virginia Beach, 234 a DEA agent contacted the claimant to 
arrange the sale of some cocaine to acquaintances of the agent. At the 
agent's insistence, the claimant allowed the agent to come to the 
claimant's residence to finalize the transaction and view the cocaine. 
The agent and the claimant then left for the site of the actual sale. On 
the way, the claimant was arrested. 
In rejecting forfeiture of the real property, the court relied on sev-
eral rationales. First, the court emphasized that the property had been 
used for only one transaction. 235 This argument is inconsistent with 
231. 769 F.2d 525 (8th Cir. 1985) (per curiam). 
232. 769 F.2d at 527. 
233. The court's characterization, of course, is disputable. The claimant did look over the 
marijuana crop while there to fix the shed. This case is most useful for illustrating the type of 
reasoning that should occur under the second degree facilitation test. 
234. 657 F. Supp. 1062 (E.D. Va. 1987). 
235. "At [the second hearing], the government conceded that it could prove only the one 
transaction on June 7, 1985, and that that single transaction was the only connection between the 
property sought to be forfeited and any criminal or drug-related activity." 657 F. s.upp. at 1064. 
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the general-subsfiiiltial connection test. Courts usually have rejected 
versions of a de minimis argument.236 
Second, the court relied on the fact that the DEA agent had in-
sisted on meeting in the claimant's house.237 The court may have been 
concerned that these actions resembled entrapment. If read this way, 
the court's decision holds that the government should not be able to 
manipulate the transaction to involve additional property that, in the 
absence of other crimfo.al involvement, would not be forfeit. In other 
words, the Certain Lots court did not attempt to identify a place on the 
spectrum of connection segregating justified and unjustified forfeitures. 
Rather, the case noted the absence of any evidence that the real prop-
erty facilitated other drug activities, and excluded the evidence from 
the single event which occurred at the insistence of the DEA agent. 
The second degree facilitation test serves as an effective surrogate 
for the substantial connection test. In addition to rationalizing some 
of the leading cases, the test provides a construct courts may be able to 
apply more consistently. The second degree facilitation test looks to 
the quality of the connection instead of attempting to place an individ-
ual case on the entire spectrum. 
B. Finding the Seeds of Eighth Amendment Analysis in the 
Substantial Connection Test 
Eighth amendment proportionality review evinces concern for the 
harshness of the penalty and the seriousness of the crime. 238 This sec-
tion establishes that these same concerns inform the substantial con-
nection cases and suggests that courts following the substantial 
connection test should consider applying full proportionality review. 
In United States v. One 1972 Chevrolet Corvette, 239 the court ap-
plied the substantial connection test on the basis of the relatively mi-
236. See, e.g., United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538 (4th Cir. 1989) (affirming forfeiture of 
substantial acreage on the basis of one sale on one part of the property); United States v. One 
Parcel of Real Estate At 7707 S.W. 14th Lane, Miami, Dade County, Fla., 868 F.2d 1214 (11th 
Cir. 1989) (same). 
The argument that forfeiture should only be applied upon a showing of multiple crimes is not 
supported by the text of§ 881. The statute calls for forfeiture after the commission of any felony. 
Additionally, to make§ 881 contingent on a pattern of behavior would be to make its forfeiture 
provisions redundant with the forfeiture provisions governing continuing criminal enterprises, 21 
u.s.c. §§ 848-853 (1988). 
237. The court wrote, 
The drugs, along with a scale, were brought from [the claimant's] place of work to his house 
on the day of the transaction, after the government informant insisted that [the claimant] 
meet him there. There is no evidence that [the claimant] used the house to store or hide 
drugs. He merely allowed the government informant to meet him there, and then only as a 
result of the informant's insistence. 
657 F. Supp. at 1065. 
238. See supra notes 183-95 and accompanying text. 
239. 625 F.2d 1026 (1st Cir. 1980). 
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nor nature of the crime.240 The court likened the involvement of the 
automobile, which served only as the financier's transportation, to an 
even more tangentially connected situation. 
Were we to accept the government's argument, [the claimant's] vehicle 
would also be subject to forfeiture if its only involvement had been to 
drive to the bank weeks later to cash a check received from [the person 
making the buy and sale], since "title" to the LSD would not pass until 
the check cleared. We cannot believe Congress intended such minimal 
involvement to trigger forfeiture.241 
Denying forfeiture in the case of insubstantial connection also fol-
lows eighth amendment concern over applying a harsh type of punish-
ment. In United States v. One 1976 Ford F-150 Pick-Up, 242 the Eighth 
Circuit followed the analysis of United States v. One 1974 Cadillac 
Eldorado Sedan, 243 and One 1972 Chevrolet Corvette. The court also 
noted that forfeiture as a penalty was to be disfavored. For support, 
the One 1976 Ford F-150 Pick-Up court quoted the Supreme Court's 
decision in United States v. One 1936 Model Ford V-8 De Luxe 
Coach. 244 "Forfeitures are not favored; they should be enforced only 
when within both letter and spirit of the law."245 In One 1936 Model 
Ford V-8, the Supreme Court also held that "[t]he forfeiture acts are 
exceedingly drastic .... It would require unclouded language to com-
pel the conclusion that Congress [intended forfeiture in these circum-
stances]. "246 Hence, courts applying the substantial connection text 
may be typing forfeiture as a harsh remedy and inquiring into the cir-
cumstances of the case to justify its application. 247 
The second degree facilitation test also comports with eighth 
amendment analysis. The second degree facilitation test would pro-
vide a line where courts could distinguish between types of offenses.248 
240. The facts are set out in the text accompanying notes 225-28 supra. 
241. 625 F.2d at 1030. 
242. 769 F.2d 525 (8th Cir. 1985) (per curiam). 
243. 548 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1977). 
244. 307 U.S. 219 (1939). 
245. 307 U.S. at 226. 
246. 307 U.S. at 236. The claimant in One 1936 Model Ford V-8 was a good faith, but 
allegedly nominal, lienholder against the vehicle which had been used to violate the liquor con-
trol and revenue laws. 
247. This review is no more invasive than the Supreme Court's offered analysis in Rummel v. 
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980). Although Rummel identified the death penalty as a unique type of 
punishment, inquiry into whether it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment requires an analy-
sis of the particular case and a determination whether the death penalty is out of proportion to 
the type of crime. Rummel 445 U.S. at 271-72. 
248. The line is, of course, subject to close cases and somewhat varying interpretations. This 
objection should not, however, destroy its utility as a starting point. See Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 
99 HARV. L. REV. 361, 380 (1985). , 
A line that is determined "arbitrarily" rather than by tracking some natural division of the 
world need not be any less precise than any other kind of line, and is often more precise. 
There is then no reason to suppose that the line, once drawn, cannot bear the burden of 
preventing a decisionmaking body from going further. 
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Courts would not be· called upon to evaluate the seriousness of any 
single drug crime or the degree of involvement of the property and 
whether forfeiture was a proportional punishment. Rather, after de-
termining whether the property facilitated the crime directly or only 
by means of a secondary mechanism, the court would either permit or 
deny forfeiture. This would foster consistency in judicial decision 
making.249 Additionally, the penalty imposed on those participating 
in large scale drug trafficking would not be impaired. Rather, those 
persons whose involvement was minor or questionable would receive 
rough justice. The security of interest in legitimately acquired prop-
erty would be preserved. 
C. Applying the Eighth Amendment to Section 881 Forfeitures 
Section 881 forfeitures should receive full proportionality review. 
Application of the court's current cruel and unusual punishments 
clause doctrine will demonstrate that some section 881 forfeitures 
should be denied or judicially mitigated. Additionally, the excessive 
fines clause provides grounds for true proportionality review of forfeit-
ures. Objections to judicial review based on practicality or on defer-
ence to the legislature fail to recognize situations where the judiciary 
engages in analogous forms of balancing. This balancing, mandated 
by respect for constitutional rights, protects claimants in civil forfei-
ture actions while maintaining the efficacy of forfeiture as a weapon 
against drug traffickers. 
The cruel and unusual punishments clause "prohibits not only bar-
baric punishments, but also sentences that are disproportionate to the 
crime committed."250 In Solem v. Helm, 251 the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the question whether its previous opinion in Rummel v. Es-
telle252 limited cruel and unusual punishment review to capital cases 
and explicitly held that it did not.253 While the Court noted that suc-
cessful eighth amendment challenges outside the capital context would 
Id. This line, however, does attempt to track the natural world. Additionally, the second degree 
facilitation test provides an additional method for analyzing forfeiture cases. It usefully shifts the 
debate from whether the connection was substantial "enough," a question fraught with policy 
implications, to whether the involvement was one or more steps removed from the activities 
identified in the forfeiture statute. 
249. This is not to foreclose the possibility that eighth amendment analysis should always be 
concerned with proportionality. The next section advocates this approach. Here, I have focused 
on the quality distinction as one way to meet the primary objection of judicial second guessing 
and to appeal to a wider body of Supreme Court decisions. Still, after Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 
277 (1983), case-by-case proportionality review is probably the better view. See infra section 
111.C. 
250. 463 U.S. at 284. 
251. 463 U.S. 277. 
252. 445 U.S. 263 (1980). Rummel is discussed supra notes 183-96 and accompanying text. 
253. Solem, 463 U.S. at 289. 
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be "exceedingly rare,"254 the Court decided that "no penalty is per se 
constitutional."255 In the course of its analysis, the Court considered 
the following factors: 
In sum, a court's proportionality analysis under the eighth amend-
ment should be guided by objective criteria, including (i) the gravity of 
the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed 
on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences im-
posed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions. 256 
Applying these factors to section 881 forfeiture will demonstrate that 
the punishment, while not per se invalid, should be tailored in each 
case to avoid constitutional infirmity.251 
Drug trafficking is, without doubt, a serious crime. Judicial notice 
of its effects abound. In Hutto v. Davis, 258 the Supreme Court reversed 
a district court finding that a forty-year sentence for sale of nine 
ounces of marijuana violated the cruel and unusual punishments 
clause. Justice Powell, concurring, characterized the sale as more seri-
ous than the offenses for which the defendant in Rummel received life 
in prison without parole.259 In United States v. Busher, 260 where the 
Ninth Circuit applied the Solem factors to RICO forfeiture, the court 
indicated that collateral consequences of the crime, "e.g., drug addic-
tion," served to increase its seriousness.261 
The collateral consequences of drug trafficking suggest a distinc-
tion between traffickers and users; drug traffickers push others to ad-
diction and traffickers probably commit the most serious violent 
crimes, not individual users.262 Section 881, however, does not distin-
254. 463 U.S. at 290 (quoting Rummel 445 U.S. at 272). 
255. 463 U.S. at 290. 
256. 463 U.S. at 292. 
257. While the court in United States v. Harris, 903 F.2d 770, 778 (10th Cir. 1990), said that 
it considered the Solem factors and held that the forfeiture was not disproportionate, the opinion 
includes no explicit discussion of those factors. 
258. 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (per curiam). 
259. 454 U.S. at 380. Justice Powell, however, did not go on to consider the other factors he 
later elucidated in his opinion for the Court in Solem. In fact, he did not address the fact that the 
defendant in Rummel was a recidivist, a factor which caused the Rummel majority pause in 
comparing punishments for other crimes. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 280 (1980). 
260. 817 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1987). 
261. 817 F.2d at 1415 (citing Solem, 463 U.S. at 293); see also Young v. Miller, 883 F.2d 
1276, 1283 (6th Cir. 1989),petitionforcert.filed (U.S. Jan. 29, 1990) (No. 89-6960). ("Petitioner 
Young was convicted of possession with intent to deliver 650 grams or more of heroin. We have 
little doubt that her crime is one of the gravest a person can commit today."); Terrebonne v. 
Butler, 848 F.2d 500, 504 (5th Cir. 1988) (en bane) ("Except in rare cases, the murderer's red 
hand falls on one victim only, however grim the blow; but the foul hand of the drug dealer 
blights life after life and, like the vampire of fable, creates others in its owner's evil image -
others who create others still, across our land and down our generations, sparing not even the 
unborn.") (quoting Terrebone v. Butler, 820 F.2d 156, 157-58 (5th Cir. 1987)). 
262. The use of drugs may have collateral consequences such as robbery. However, this 
collateral activity is independently criminalized and is not of the nature of addiction. By con-
trast, drug trafficking, by its very nature, encourages widespread addiction. In any event, the 
collateral effects of trafficking certainly have a much wider ambit. 
204 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 89:165 
guish based on the claimant's position in the distribution chain. Sec-
tions 88l(a)(l) and (2),263 the sections triggering forfeiture, focus 
solely on connection with illegal drugs. The courts presently have not 
adopted a de rninirnis exception for users.264 The differing gravity of 
the consequences suggest that courts should look to the individual cir-
cumstances before ordering forfeiture. 
The second prong of the Solem analysis requires a comparison of 
penalties for other crimes in federal drug law. With the exception of 
49 U.S.C. section 781, section 881 forfeiture applies to far less severe 
criminal activity than other forfeiture statutes.265 Outside section 881, 
forfeiture may be imposed for a drug crime either by criminal forfei-
ture266 or by forfeiture of a continuing criminal enterprise.267 In both 
circumstances, the scope of the potential punishment is much nar-
rower. Criminal forfeiture may be granted only when the defendant 
has been found guilty of an offense "punishable by imprisonment for 
more than one year."268 Narcotics offenses carrying prison terms of 
more than one year include: manufacturing or distributing,269 distrib-
uting drugs without a prescription or forging prescriptions,270 manu-
facturing or distributing in or near schools,271 and employment of 
persons under eighteen years of age for the purpose of avoiding the 
narcotics laws.272 Specifically excluded from punishment by imprison-
ment for greater than one year is simple possession.273 Proof of a con-
tinuing criminal enterprise likewise requires showing substantial 
criminal activity.274 These statutes recognize that forfeiture is a seri-
ous penalty to be applied only to significant criminal activities, and do 
263. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(l), (2) (1988); see supra note 170. 
264. See supra note 236 (citing cases where de minimis exception has been rejected). 
265. Since§ 881 seems to have been based on§ 781, see supra notes 23-33 and accompanying 
text, the similarity of the penalties should not be given much corroborative value. Rather, these 
statutes should be compared versus forfeiture in other arenas. 
266. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(l), (2) (1988). 
267. 21 U.S.C. § 848(c) (1988) defines a continuing criminal enterprise. 21 U.S.C. 
§ 853(a)(3) (1988) provides for forfeiture of any interest in a continuing criminal enterprise. 
268. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (1988). 
269. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1988). 
270. 21 U.S.C. § 843(a) (1988). 
271. 21 U.S.C. § 845a(a) (1988). 
272. 21 U.S.C. § 845b(a) (1988). 
273. 21 U.S.C. § 844 (1988); see also 21 U.S.C.A. § 844a (West Supp. 1990) (civil penalty for 
personal use possession). 
274. 
"[A] person is engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise if -
(1) he violates any provision ..• the punishment for which i$ a felony, and 
(2) such violation is a part of a continuing series of violations ••• 
(A) which are undertaken by such person in concert with five or more other per-
sons with respect to whom such person occupies a position of organizer, a supervi-
sory position or any other position of management, and 
(B) from which such person obtains substantial income or resources. 
21 U.S.C. § 848(c) (1988). 
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not require forfeiture for crimes punishable by less than one year in 
prison. Since individual users cannot be punished for longer than one 
year,275 these statutes explicitly track the distinction previously made, 
between drug traffickers and users. Further, these statutes at least im-
plicitly recognize a per se exemption for the casual user. 
The third Solem factor requires comparison of section 881 to state 
forfeiture statutes. While several state forfeiture statutes substantially 
follow section 881,276 these statutes are narrower than section 881 in 
some significant ways. For example, the Supreme Court of Kentucky 
has held the presumption of forfeitability applied to money found on a 
drug trafficker is rebutted when the defendant has been acquitted in a 
criminal proceeding. 277 While this does not limit directly the scope of 
the property forfeitable, this presumption does accord additional pro-
cedural protection to the claimant.278 Both Kentucky and South Da-
kota exempt from forfeiture property used to facilitate crimes 
involving personal use amounts of marijuana.279 
The standard for utilizing this data is unclear. First, while the 
statutory language may be similar, the courts of many states have yet 
to address the scope of their statutes.280 Section 881 itself preempts 
state law and requires forfeiture of the offending property to the 
275. Absent showing recidivism. 21 U.S.C. § 844 (1988). 
276. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 17.30.110 (1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4135 (1985); KY. 
REv. STAT. ANN. § 218A.410 (Michie Supp. 1988); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-31-34 (1989); S.D. 
CoDIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-20B-70 (1986); TENN. CooE ANN. § 53-11-409 (Supp. 1989); W. 
VA. CooE § 60A-7-703 (1989). 
About one-third of the states do not have effective asset-seizure laws and rely almost 
entirely on Federal prosecutors, said Cary H. Copeland, director of the office for asset forfei-
ture in the United States Department of Justice. And only a handful of states, including 
California, Arizona, Florida and New Jersey, have been very active in bringing cases to 
confiscate the assets of drug dealers. 
Hinds, States Seek Tougher Drug Forfeit Laws, N.Y. Times, July 16, 1990, at All. 
The forfeiture provision of the UNIF. CoNTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT, § 505, 9 U.L.A. 833 
(1988), was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 
1970. Section 505(a)(4) provides for forfeiture of "all conveyances ... which are used, or in-
tended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, for the purpose of 
sale or receipt of [illegal drugs] ..•. " The provision, similar to 21 U.S.C. § 88l(a)(4) (1988), see 
supra note 8, has not been updated by the commissioners to reflect changes in the federal law. 
Although the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws was to consider 
strengthening § 505 in mid-July 1990, Hinds, supra, at Al 1, no amendment was adopted and the 
proposal was referred back to a drafting committee, telephone conversation with John McCabe 
from the Commissioners' Office. See also Goldsmith & Lindermen, supra note 17, at 1291-94 
(reviewing state forfeiture laws). 
277. Smith v. Commonwealth, 707 S.W.2d 342 (Ky. 1986). 
278. Under § 881, acquittal on criminal charges implies nothing about forfeitability. See, 
e.g., One Blue 1977 AMC Jeep CJ-5 v. United States, 783 F.2d 759, 762 (8th Cir. 1986); United 
States v. One Clipper Bow Ketch Nisku, 548 F.2d 8, 10 n.2 (1st Cir. 1977); United States v. 
Property Identified as 3120 Banneker Drive, N.E., Washington, D.C., 691 F. Supp. 497, 499 
(D.D.C. 1988). 
279. KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 218A.410(h)(4) (Michie Supp. 1988); S.D. CoDIFIED LAWS 
ANN. § 34-20B-70(4) (1986). 
280. For example, the annotated codes of each of the state statutes cited supra note 276 listed 
few cases under each statute. 
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United States,281 thus depriving states of the opportunity to litigate the 
issue. Second, interpretation of state forfeiture statutes likely will fol-
low the federal experience. 282 Third, it is unclear how much disso-
nance between the punishment applied in a given case and the practice 
in other jurisdictions must exist for an eighth amendment violation to 
be found. In Solem v. Helm, 283 the Supreme Court found that the 
questioned penalty, life without prospect of parole for a seventh nonvi-
olent crime, was more severe than that which could be applied in any 
other state.284 The Court overturned the sentence. In Young v. 
Miller, 285 on the other hand, the Sixth Circuit upheld a sentence of life 
imprisonment without parole for a first time offender involved in the 
sale of 650 grams of heroin. The court there noted that the sentence 
imposed by Michigan was the harshest allowed in the nation, but was 
not so out of line with other states as to justify overruling it.286 
The best resolution of this indeterminate standard of review would 
be to adopt a case-by-case approach, giving greater weight to the com-
parable federal provisions. Forfeiture will not be excessive in all cir-
cumstances, especially in cases involving large scale drug trafficking. 
Because section 881 authorizes forfeiture in even the most minimal 
cases, the factors of individual cases should be weighed. In general, 
the three-part Solem analysis justifies careful consideration of forfei-
ture in individual use cases. The collateral effects of personal use are 
substantially smaller than trafficking. Federal forfeiture statutes in 
other areas and some state statutes modeled after section 881 seem to 
recognize the severity of forfeiture and restrict its use to serious 
crimes. 
Case-by-case analysis of forfeitures would follow the requirements 
of the excessive fines clause. While the cruel and unusual punishment 
clause may seem, on its face, focused on specific types of punishments 
that can be identified in the abstract, the excessive fines clause seems to 
require considering each case individually. An absolute rule, that all 
fines over a certain dollar amount are excessive would make little 
sense. Rather, "excessive" depends upon the context of a certain 
case.281 
281. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a), (h) (1988). 
282. See, e.g., Resek v. State, 706 P.2d 288 n.9 (Alaska 1985) (referring to federal cases 
construing section 881 in interpreting Alaska's forfeiture statute). 
283. 463 U.S. 277 (1983). 
284. 463 U.S. at 299-300. 
285. 883 F.2d 1276 (6th Cir. 1989). 
286. 883 F.2d at 1284-85. 
287. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3572(a) (1988): 
In determining whether to impose a fine, and the amount, time for payment, and method of 
payment of a fine, the court shall consider, in addition to the factors set forth in section 
3553(a)-
(1) the defendant's income, earning capacity, and financial resources; 
(2) the burden that the fine will impose upon the defendant, any person who is finan-
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Unfortunately, the excessive fines clause has not been central to 
much litigation, especially in the criminal arena. 288 The Supreme 
Court has said merely that "the text is explicit that bail and fines may 
not be excessive."289 Two standards are possible. First, the courts 
could simply affirm any forfeiture unless it shocked "the judicial con-
science. "290 Second, the excessive fines clause might require an in-
quiry into the circumstances of each individual case. For example, a 
court would consider the gravity of the individual offense, the extent 
of criminal behavior of the defendant, and the defendant's financial 
situation. 
Courts employ the second standard in many other areas.29 1 Any 
fine imposed in criminal proceedings must be evaluated against a de-
tailed list of case-specific criteria.292 In bail proceedings, when preven-
tive detention is not an issue, courts follow the factor analysis 
cially dependent on the defendant, or any other person •.. that would be responsible for the 
welfare of any person financially dependent on the defendant, • . . ' 
(3) any pecuniary loss inflicted upon others as a result of the offense; 
(4) whether restitution is ordered or made and the amount of such restitution; 
(5) the need to deprive the defendant of illegally obtained gains from the offense .•.. 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1988) provides: 
The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider -
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of 
the defendant; 
(2) the need for the sentence imposed -
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to 
provide just punishment for the offense; 
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; 
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and 
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medi-
cal care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner .•.. 
Applying these criteria would require some distinctions between offenders based on their 
offenses. 
288. In some cases, in fact, courts have treated the excessive fines clause as a mere subset of 
the cruel and unusual punishments clause. See, e.g., United States v. Elkins, 885 F.2d 775, 789 
(11th Cir. 1989) (''There may be circumstances where an excessive fine constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment."). 
289. Solem, 463 U.S. at 289. 
290. See Electro Services, Inc. v. Exide Corp., 847 F.2d 1524, 1530-31 (11th Cir. 1988) (the 
court found that excessive fines clause did not apply to a punitive damages award between two 
private, civil plaintiffs. If the excessive fines clause had applied, the court held, the award would 
still stand unless it "shock[ed] the judicial conscience."). 
291. The Solem Court wrote, 
For sentences of imprisonment, the problem is not so much one of ordering, but one of 
line-drawing. It is clear that a 25-year sentence generally is more severe than a 15-year 
sentence, but in most cases it would be difficult to decide that the former violates the Eighth 
Amendment while the latter does not. Decisions of this kind, although troubling, are not 
unique to this area. The courts are constantly called upon to draw similar lines in a variety 
of contexts. 
Solem, 463 U.S. at 294 (footnote omitted). The Solem Court pointed to case-by-case determina-
tions of speedy trial right violations and to the right to jury trial decisions. 463 U.S. at 294-95. 
292. See 18 U.S.C. § 3572(a) (1988) (text set out supra note 287); NATL. INST. OF JUSTICE, 
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, FINES IN SENTENCING: A STUDY OF THE USE OF THE FINE AS A 
CRIMINAL SANCTION 58-64 (1984). 
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described by Congress in setting bail.293 These factors have been held 
to protect against the imposition of excessive fines. 294 
RICO provides an example of how courts could review forfeitures 
to effectuate eighth amendment concerns. In RICO, courts routinely 
determine the extent of the property used to maintain the RICO enter-
prise. The difficult arena for section 881 forfeiture is the seizure of 
legitimately acquired property. In RICO, however, the seizure is lim-
ited to the tainted proceeds.295 Because of this limitation, eighth 
amendment concerns are mitigated. The forfeiture consists only of the 
illegal proceeds from the RICO enterprise. The Second Circuit's anal-
ysis in United States v. Huber 296 typifies the strategy. 
We do not say that no forfeiture sanction may ever be so harsh as to 
violate the Eighth Amendment. But at least where the provision .•. is 
keyed to the magnitude of a defendant's criminal enterprise, as it is in 
RICO, the punishment is at least in some rough way proportional to the 
crime. We further note that where the forfeiture threatens dispropor-
tionately to reach untainted property of a defendant, for example, if the 
criminal and legitimate aspects of the "enterprise" have been commin-
gled over time, section 1963 permits the district court a certain amount 
of discretion in avoiding draconian (and perhaps potentially unconstitu-
tional) applications of the forfeiture provision. 297 
This strategy is analogous to the distinction previously drawn, that 
assets derived from drug transactions under section 88l(a)(6) clearly 
are forfeitable.298 Forfeitures proceeding under section 88l(a)(4) or 
293. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (1988); see also Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951) ("Since the 
function of bail is limited, the fixing of bail for any individual defendant must be based upon 
standards relevant to the purpose of assuring the presence of that defendant.") (emphasis added). 
While the Court in United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752-54 (1987), explicitly refused any 
implication that Stack v. Boyle required the courts to admit every defendant to bail, the Court 
emphasized that the detention determination must be individualized. 481 U.S. at 750-52. Fur-
ther, preventative detention is a temporary measure, unlike forfeiture. 
294. See, e.g., Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951) (The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
provide the standards for constitutionally required determination of individualized bail.); United 
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (Bail Reform Act provides protection for defendant's 
constitutional rights.). 
295. See, e.g., United States v. Porcelli, 865 F.2d 1352, 1365 (2d Cir. 1989) ("The Congres-
sional aim guiding these forfeitures is to recover all of the racketeer's ill-gotten gains but not to 
seize legitimately acquired property."). 
296. 603 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1979). 
297. 603 F.2d at 397; see also United States v. Acosta, 881 F.2d 1039, 1041 n.4 (11th Cir. 
1989) (RICO forfeiture does not violate the eighth amendment because, "in light of the extent of 
appellant's racketeering activities and his resulting profits, the forfeitures in the instant case serve 
merely to divest appellant of his ill-gotten wealth."); United States v. Feldman, 853 F.2d 648, 663 
(9th Cir. 1988) ("When the district court orders that the defendant forfeit the profits gained from 
illegal activity, it is hard to imagine how such a forfeiture could constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment."); United States v. Kravitz, 738 F.2d 102, 106-07 (3d Cir. 1984) (declining to reach 
eighth amendment issue because property seized was " 'keyed to the magnitude of a defendant's 
criminal enterprise' ") (quoting Huber, 603 F.2d at 397); United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 
1026, 1039 (4th Cir. 1980) (magnitude of forfeiture keyed to magnitude of defendant's interest in 
illegal enterprises). 
298. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
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(a)(7), on the other hand, would be more carefully scrutinized as a fine 
since the defendant initially acquired the property legitimately. 
The RICO example also serves to refute the major criticism of ex-
tended judicial use of eighth amendment review. The main objection 
to employing the eighth amendment in this context, and indeed the 
main concern of the majority in Rummel v. Estelle, 299 is that the fed-
eral courts not evaluate the appropriateness of the length of a sen-
tence. If the decision is whether to impose X or Y number of years of 
identical confinement or X or Y dollars fine, the legislature may indeed 
be the more competent or otherwise appropriate decisionmaker.300 
The Rummel court, however, argued that courts are competent to 
evaluate whether a certain type of punishment is excessive for the 
crime committed. In Solem, the dissenters, who numbered among the 
majority in Rummel, worried that the judiciary would substitute their 
own judgment for the sentences prescribed by the legislature. 301 Still, 
the judiciary must "ultimately decide the meaning of the Eighth 
Amendment."302 The RICO example demonstrates that the judiciary 
is capable of focusing on the activity Congress wished to stop while 
protecting eighth amendment concerns. 
Increased judicial diligence in monitoring the magnitude of forfei-
ture will not harm the war on drugs. 303 The assets which constitute 
illegally derived profits will be subject to forfeiture without question. 
Further, through the appropriate use of presumptions, few large scale 
traffickers will retain conveyances or real property when forfeiture is 
sought under sections 881(a)(4) or (a)(7). For example, courts could 
presume that the automobiles of a large scale drug trafficker without 
other visible means of support actually were bought with proceeds 
from illegal activities, despite the difficulty of directly proving that 
fact.304 Finally, even if the conveyance or real property was legiti-
299. 445 U.S. 263 (1979); see supra notes 192-96 and accompanying text. 
300. See Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274. 
301. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 314 (1983) (Burger, J., dissenting); Rummel v. Estelle, 
445 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1980). 
302. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 279. 
303. See, e.g., United States v. 1964 Beechcraft Baron Aircraft, TC-740, 691 F.2d 725 (5th 
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 914 (1983); see also Note, supra note 16, at 333-34 (paraphras-
ing United States v. One 1974 Cadillac- Eldorado Sedan, 548 F.2d 421, 427 (2d Cir. 1977)). 
304. This was the approach taken by the court in United States v. $33,000 United States 
Currency, 640 F. Supp. 898 (D. Md. 1986). The claimant asserted that the money constituted 
proceeds from the sale of a horse, coins and stocks. The court held, however, that the horse was 
purchased at a time when the claimant had no other means of support. Therefore, the horse and 
its proceeds were drug proceeds and forfeit. 640 F. Supp. at 899-900; see also United States v. 
Parcels of Land, 903 F.2d 36, 39-40 (1st Cir. 1990) ("The sheer magnitude of [claimant's] ex-
penditures supports an inference that his property acquisitions were funded with the proceeds of 
drug trafficking; [the claimant's] millions of dollars in purchases far exceeded his reported aver-
age annual income of $27,690, and there was no other apparent legitimate source of money to 
account for this magnitude of expenditures."); United States v. One 1986 Nissan Maxima GL., 
895 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1990) (automobile bought with cash by person with no legitimate means 
of obtaining that much cash was forfeit). Cf. United States v. All Funds and Other Property 
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mately purchased, the court still may find, after review of its propor-
tionality or excessiveness, that the forfeiture constituted an acceptable 
fine for the defendant's criminal activity. 
This Part has attempted to give some substance to the substantial 
connection test and to eighth amendment review of section 881 forfei-
ture. The substantial connection test should be refocused on how re-
moved the conveyance or real property sought has been to the 
underlying drug activity. While a step in the right direction, even the 
"second degree facilitation" test does not fully protect claimants fac-
ing civil forfeiture. To that end, this section has demonstrated that 
eighth amendment review of section 881 forfeiture would, at a mini-
mum, exempt many individual users and should be applied to protect 
the rights of all defendants. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This Note offers two justifications for narrowing the scope of civil 
forfeiture. Courts should adopt the substantial connection test as the 
best reading of section 881. Admittedly, the language of the section 
seems to support the broadest possible scope for forfeiture. This Note 
has contended, however, that Section 881, read against the full range 
of interpretive aids, commands forfeiture only where the property 
bears a substantial connection to the underlying criminal activity. 
Courts should also treat each forfeiture as if it were a criminal fine 
and evaluate its proportionality. Civil forfeiture often extinguishes le-
gitimately acquired property rights. These forfeitures are executed 
without regard to the magnitude of the crime, the value of the prop-
erty or any characteristics of the individual defendant. This Note has 
argued therefore that section 881 operates as a criminal punishment. 
Further, when the government seeks forfeiture, eighth amendment 
protections against government punishment are implicated; each for-
feiture should be subject to individual proportionality review. Civil 
forfeiture is a powerful weapon for eliminating the profit of drug traf-
ficking. The very power of the weapon mandates guarding against 
abuse. 
- James B. Speta 
Contained in Account Number 031-217362, 661 F. Supp. 697, 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (once the 
government proves some money in an account is tainted, the claimant bears the burden of prov-
ing any portion is not). 
